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THE SOCIAL VICE OF ACCIDENT INDEMNITY
HERBERT D. LAUBE t
The automobile is more deadly than war.1 It is more fatal than earth-
quakes 2 in Italy, the classic home of the earthquake. It is deadlier than the
five worst infectious diseases combined.3 The toll of lives claimed by the
automobile in the United States in i93O was estimated to be 32,500. In
the same year, more than 960,00 persons suffered from non-fatal injuries.4
American hospitals spend $70,000,ooo annually caring for the victims of
automobile accidents, who are without funds.5 The automobile has deprived
thousands of women and children of their support and left them dependent
widows and orphans.6 It has produced an annual national economic loss
estimated approximately at a billion dollars .7  However extravagant or in-
accurate these observations may be, if they have a substantial basis, then
one must readily concede that such a situation constitutes one of our major
social problems."
An advocate of compulsory automobile insurance has said that the law
now furnishes in case of accident only one method for securing compensa-
tion-a lawsuit.
"And any one who brings a suit finds himself forthwith en-
shrouded in a cloud of difficulties. It is interesting, it is pathetic, it is
tragic to see how these difficulties pile themselves up to obstruct the
plaintiff's progress and the prompt and certain attainment of any just
result." 9
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There should be a remedy for "this nightmare of complication, confusion,
delay, extravagance and injustice" against which he protests. Another advo-
cate complains 30 that in case of automobile accidents resulting in personal
injury, insurance has taken a "peculiar form" which does not furnish ade-
quate protection either for the community or for the car-owner. This thesis
is primarily concerned with the judicial interpretation of the "peculiar form"
of the insurance policy which disappointed this advocate's expectations and
which enshrouded the plaintiff in a "cloud of difficulties." The ever-grow-
ing field of statute law, providing for the financial responsibility of the
owners and operators of motor vehicles, has been characterized as a sig-
nificant legislative contribution to the growth of the law. Such a need has
been declared to be due to the inability of the machinery of the common
law, which was fashioned to meet the needs of a past era, to cope with this
problem. 1 The indemnity policy is mentioned as a notable obstacle, which
frequently defeated the victim in recovering compensation for his injuries.
A careful review of the decisions reveals that it was not so much the ina-
bility of the common law to cope with this problem as it was the inability
of the judges,' 2 whose archaic reverence for a mediaeval conception ob-
scured their vision. Commitment of the courts to an outworn policy may
be too firm to be broken by the tools of the judicial process,' 3 but it does
not excuse the intellectual blindness of the courts to the interest of society
in the physical integrity of the individual victimized by accident.
Is i ndemnity a Gaming Contract.
No man should be allowed to bargain for an advantage to arise upon
the destruction of life or property, for that is to wager.' 4 The chief objec-
tion to a wagering contract is that it leads to unearned gain. Unearned
gain has harmful social consequences.' 5 If one takes out a policy of insur-
ance upon the life of a person in whom he has no interest whatever, his
risk is created by the contract itself. It is a wagering or gambling con-
tract.1 6  An insurable interest is necessary to the validity of a policy of
insurance. The object of insurance is not to make a possible gain but to
avert a possible loss. A policy without such an interest has nothing in
Compensation for Accidents (1927) 52 NEw REP. 112.
'Note (1930) 30 COL. L. REV. 109.
"Surely every loyal, thinking person in our political community must deplore undue
criticism of the great common law which so wisely regulates every consequential act of our
lives, from the cradle to the grave. But there is reason to think that the common law in this
instance is not so defective as supposed, and the fault lies with the unreasoned adjudications
of inferior courts." In re Kathan's Will, 14I N. Y. Supp. 705, 707 (1913).
CARDozo, PARADOxEs OF THE LEGAL ScIENcE (1928) 64.
1*THOMAS, MORTGAGES (3d ed. 1914) 460.
Patterson, Insurable Interest in Life (1918) x8 Co. L. REv. 381,'386.
COOLEY, BRIEFS ON INSUaANCE (2d ed. 1927) 333.
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common with insurance except in name and form. It is a species of gaming,
pregnant with mischief.17
In discussing the validity of a policy of insurance to indemnify against
damages for personal injury by accident in the operation of an automobile,
the Pennsylvania court has said:
"There was a time when all insurance, and especially of life, was
looked upon with suspicion and disfavor, but it was only because re-
garded as a species of wagering contract. That time has gone by.
And with the intelligent study of political economy bringing the recog-
nition of the fact that even the most apparently disconnected and
sporadic occurrences are subject to at least an approximate law of
averages, the insurance against loss from any such occurrence has been
recognized as a legitimate subject of protection to the individual by a
guaranty of indemnity from some party undertaking to distribute and
divide the loss among a number of others for a premium giving them
a prospect of profit.""'
Such contracts of indemnity are distinguished from gaming contracts be-
cause they create no inducement or temptation to commit fraud or crime
even though there is great disparity between the consideration paid and the
indemnity received by the insured.19 According to Professor Vance, the
gambling contract is based upon an event in which the assured has no interest
other than the payment of the wager. "The gambler courts fortune; the
insured seeks to avoid misfortune." 20 An indemnity contract is primarily
a contract of investment. However, when the contract steps beyond indem-
nity, it becomes obnoxious as a wagering policy.
21
In the light of these generally accepted pronouncements, let us exam-
ine the decision in Kinnan v. Fidelity & Casualty CoY.2  In that case, the
plaintiff, an employee, sued his employer to recover damages for personal
injuries and he obtained a judgment for $15oo. Before judgment was
entered and during the pendency of a motion for a new trial, the defendant-
employer released his indemnitor for $IOOO and immediately left the state.
But, he left no property behind him out of which to satisfy the judgment.
By the settlement, the indemnitor was richer by $50o and the insured-y
$iooo. Broadly, the question was whether it was legal for the Casualty
Company and the insured to traffic in the miseries of their victim. Action
was brought by the employee to recover from the indemnitor the amount
17 Pritchet v. Insurance Co. of N. America, 3 Yeates 458, 464 (Pa. 1803).
BGould v. Brock, 221 Pa. 38, 4o, 69 Atl. 1122 (19o8).
" CooLEY, op. cit. supra note 16, at 2o2.
2' VANcF, INsU ANcE (2d ed. 193o) 66, 1:23.
a Hoven v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., 93 Wis. 201, 204, 67 N. W. 46, 47
(1896).
2 io7 IIl. App. 406, 410 (1903).
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
of his judgment. Relief was denied to the injured employee because it did
not appear that the settlement was not made in good faith.
Whether it was made in good faith or not, both parties had profited
by the misfortune of their victim. The question of good faith was irrele-
-vant. The court's decision clearly made it a wagering contract, if the con-
tract is to be judged by the result. This case illustrates that, under indem-
nity contracts, the injured person receives very little consideration either
from the contract or from the court.28  The burden of death and injury is
borne by the crippled or by the dependents of the victim of the accident.
The stockholders of the accident companies and the reckless insured take
the profits and the victim and his family are left to the care of charity.2
Nothing would seem more clear than the fact that indemnity in case of in-
juries from accident is the most vicious form of gambling unless the assets
of the policy or their equivalent are appropriated to the payment of the claim
of the injured victim. As late as 1924, an Illinois court declared that "No
question of public policy is involved" in a policy of indemnity against loss
from ac cident.-5  Yet, in 1923, the year before the decision, there were
bills pending in the legislatures of twenty-four states in response to a de-
mand for compulsory automobile insurance.26  The court assumed that
because an Illinois statute 27 authorized an employer to insure against loss
or damage resulting from injuries to his employees that the statute author-
ized the employer to appropriate the assets of the policy to the exclusion
of his injured victim.
That fallacy permeates many decisions. In a much cited Massachu-
setts case 2 the court, recognizing the harmful social consequences of its
decision, declared:
"If the usual result of insurance against liability for damages
respecting accidental injuries to others was to give money to the in-
sured when he was not obligated to compensate the person injured, it
would be for the Legislature to say whether such insurance should not
be prohibited as contrary to public policy." 29
In the face of such a problem, it ill-becomes any learned court to make such
an unfounded confession of impotence. Even though the statute permitted
the employer to insure against liability or loss from accident to his em-
- Smith Stage Co. v. Eckert, 21 Ariz. 28, 36, 184 Pac. IOOI, ioo3 (I919).
"4Rollins, Proposal to Extend the Compensation Principle to Accidents in the Streets
(x919) 4 MAss. L. Q. 392, 393. See also Marx, Compulsory Compensation Insurance (925)
25 Coi. L. RE. 164, 184.
' Kinnan v. Globe Indemnity Co., 233 Ill. App. 451, 457 (1924).
Ives, Compulsory Liability Insurance with Special Reference to Automobiles (1925)
59 Am. L. REv. i39, 144.
Supra note 25, at 455.
Bain v. Atldns, I8I Mass. 24o, 63 N. E. 414 (902).
"*Supra note 28, at 245, 63 N. E. at 415.
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ployees, it requires no superior sensibilities to know that such indemnity was
not designed to enable the employer to exploit his employees. To the extent
that the assets of the policy or their equivalent were not made available to
the injured employees, it was "graveyard insurance". And, certainly, such
a policy was not within the purview of the law. It would seem that the
court was suffering primarily from a lack of resourcefulness, and not from
a lack of power.
Very often, the same fallacy is found beneath another guise. A New
York court 30 formulates the defective argument this way: "The owner of
an automobile is not required to procure liability insurance. When he does
so, it is for his own protection." No court seems ever to have attempted
to define the limit of the insurable interest which the assured has in the
life and limb of his prospective victim. He has an insurable interest only
to the extent of the amount which his victim receives from him in settlement
of damages for his injury. If he receives more than that, he profits by his
own wrong. It was the welfare of the victim which prompted Mr. Justice
Nunn, dissenting, to say:
"But if the principle of insurable interest be overlooked or dis-
regarded, then the business is indefensible, and becomes a curse to
society.31 . . .And I am sure no method of construction should be
adopted which . . . would create an inducement for the employer
to be careless of the safety of his employees, without at the same time
giving the employee a right under the contract to be compensated for
an injury growing out of the increased hazard which the contract
caused." 32
Certainly, it is clear that unless the assured actually appropriates the assets
of the policy or the equfivalent to payment of damages to the injured per-
son, he has no insurable interest in the life or limb of his victim. He is
either a gambler or a trickster and a fraud. Whether he was compelled
to take out insurance or not, has nothing to do with the question. If he
does take out insurance, it is a sine qua non to the validity of the contract
that he shall not profit by his own liability for negligence. The fundamental
question, from a social point of view, is not whether a policy to indemnify
against a liability for killing is valid,3 3 but rather whether any judicial con-
struction of stich a policy which does not give primarily the benefits of it
to the injured person is defensible. Generally, the validity of the policy is
conceded. The controversy has been over the short-sighted judicial inter-
- Hermance v. Globe Indemnity Co., 221 App. Div. 394, 398, 223 N. Y. Supp. 93, 97
(1927) ; aff'd vithout opinion, 251 N. Y. 513, 168 N. E. 409 (I929).
"Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N. Y. v. Martin, 163 Ky. 12, 32, 173 S. W. 307, 315 (1915).
"Supra note 3r, at 35, 173 S. W. at 316.
1 Motor Insurance and Public Policy (1927) 163 L. T. 269.
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pretation which has shown a serene indifference to predatory practices of
a crass and brutal individualism.84
In discussing the right of the injured to receive ultimately the benefit
of the policy, Lord Hanworth recently said:
"Now I think it is quite clear that most people would think that
there ought to be a right on the part of Mr. Chaplin (injured) to re-
cover the sum which has been paid to the defendants (assured) in the
action on the strength of the liability under which they had been placed
to him ...
". . . It is, perhaps, unfortunate that one should have to give
a judgment which would, at first sight, appear to run counter to what
I might call the common-sense view of the proceedings. None the
less it is necessary for us to administer the law as it stands . . ." 35
And so the Master of the Rolls sacrificed his victim at the altar of juris-
prudence, when he should have merely accorded him the benefits to which
common-sense entitled him. The court sympathized with the victim; Mr.
Justice Lawrence 38 apologetically said:
"Of course, however much we may sympathize with the appel-
lant in this case, we cannot allow that sympathy to lead us astray, or
to do otherwise than to administer the law as it exists."
According to Dean Pound's test, the English court failed in its resourceful-
ness. For the task of a judge is to make legal principles vital by achieving,
through useful labor, a just result in the intelligent application of the prin-
ciples of law to a concrete case.3 7 Compare this "strong decision", due to
the sympathetic short-sightedness of the English court and decidedly opposed
to common sense,38 to the illuminating appreciation pf Mr. Justice Doerfler,
dissenting, in a Wisconsin case: 39
"The assured, in taking out a policy of this kind, has in mind the
accomplishment of two purposes; first, the creation of a fund out of
which a person injured through the involuntary negligence of the
assured may be in a degree compensated for such injury; second, a pro-
tection to himself from liability under the policy on the happening of
an injury. The former consideration is perhaps of greater importance
to the assured and the public than the latter. The public is interested
to the extent of having due compensation paid to the injured, so that
he may not become a burden or charge upon the community. Such a
"Wkm, THE NEw DmomAcy (1927) 43.
'In re Harrington Motor Co., Ltd. [1928] I Ch. 105, 10, iii, 59 A. L. R. IIII, 1114
(1929).
*' Supra note 35, at 124, 59 A. L. R. at 1122.
Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence (i9o8) 8 Co. L. REV. 6o5, 622.
Supra note 37, at 6o8.
Glatz v. General Acc. Fire & L. Assur. Corp., 175 Wis. 42, 5o, 183 N. W. 683, 686(19i).
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policy is also designed to inure not only to the benefit of the injured,
but in many cases to the benefit of his immediate dependents in case
the injury results in death."
Accordingly, one feels the social interest will not tolerate the assured to
receive from the policy any greater benefit than he bestows upon the person
whom he injures. And the extent of his insurable interest in the life of
the injured party is measured by benefits which the injured is to receive
under it, because the assured cannot profit by it.
Indemnity: Loss v. Liability
Indemnity policies have been said to be divided into two well recog-
nized classes: policies to indemnify against loss and policies to indemnify
against liability.40 Loss from liability arises immediately upon one becom-
ing liable to another, and not from loss which arises upon such liability
being paid and extinguished. The distinction has been well expressed in a
Missouri case: 41
"There is a well recognized difference between contracts of in-
demnity against loss and contracts of indemnity against liability. In
the former the insurance company does not become liable until loss has
actually been suffered and the amount of insurance does not become
available until the assured has paid the loss, whereas in the latter case
the obligation of the insurance company becomes fixed when the lia-
bility attaches to the insured."
However, frequently the word "indemnity" is used inaccurately by way
of contrast to "liability" to distinguish the two types of policies, when in
fact the latter is also a policy of indemnity.
42
Professor Williston approves this distinction which has been made
repeatedly in the decisions. He says that it is a distinction sound in prin-
ciple, though often difficult to draw in fact.43 That it is sound may well be
doubted. The difficulty in drawing the distinction in fact seems to be per-
' Maryland Casualty.Co. v. Peppard, 53 Okla. 515, 522, 157 Pac. io6, io8 (196).
" Klotzbach v. Bull Dog Auto Fire Ins. Ass'n, 267 S. W. 39, 40 (Mo. App. 1924). See
also Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Fordyce, 64 Ark. 174, 179, 41 S. W. 420, 422 (1897) ; Tran-
sylvania Casualty Ins. Co. v. Williams, 209 Ky. 626, 629, 273 S. W. 536 (1925) ; Capelle v.
United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 8o N. H. 481, i2o Ati. 556 (1922) j Gilbert v. Wiman, i N.
Y. 55o, 563 (1848) ; Howard, Insurance-iight of Injured Party to Sue (1929) 9 ORa. L.
REV. 57, 63.
Note (1924) 24 CoL. L. REv. 173, 175. See also American Employers' Liability Ins.
Co. v. Fordyce, 62 Ark. 562, 569, 36 S. W. IO51, 1053 (1896) ; McBride v. Aetna Ins. Co.,
126 Ark. 528, 532, 191 S. W. 5, 6 (1917); Note (925) 37 A. L. R. 644.
"WULISTON, -CoNmTRcrs (1920) § 1409. "Generally speaking, a liability does not be-
come a loss till the person liable parts with or is deprived of something of value in conse-
quence of the liability. A judgment fixes the liability, but there is no loss or damage until
the person liable, the judgment debtor, parts with something of value in payment or satisfac-
tion of the same." Sturgis, P. J., in Stag Minirtg Co. v. Missouri Fidelity & Casualty Co.,
209 S. W. 321, 323 (Mo. App. 1919).
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suasive reason for doubting its soundness. An analysis of the cases seems
to prove that it is formal and artificial.
In an early Minnesota case,4 a bond was given "to indemnify . .
against any legal liability." To solve the problem which the litigants raised
the court religiously resorted to the dictionaries, the authoritative sources
of verbal light. It found that Webster and Worcester agreed that to "in-
demnify" was "to save harmless" or "to secure against loss or damage".
Although the word could be used in two senses, by some mysterious process
-perhaps it was mathematical-the court concluded that "indemnity" in
the bond was used in the latter sense. Of course, legal science has pro-
gressed since 1870 (the date of the case). The legalists of today, probably,
would not approve the decision. Still, it is admitted that there is a con-
flict 4 as to whether any given language makes a policy one of indemnity
against liability or against loss.
Generally, indemnity against loss from liability is not construed to be
indemnity against liability.4 6 But Oklahoma 4 7 says:
"In our judgment, it is faulty reasoning which leads to the con-
clusion that one can suffer no loss if he is unable to pay that which
he is under obligation to pay. Many modem business men, we dare
say, would deem the loss of money insignificant compared to the loss
of good name, not to mention other losses which inevitably follow
inability to meet honest obligations."
In some cases in order to make it clear that indemnity against loss really
meant "loss", it was characterized as an "actual loss" 48 or "actual pecuniary
loss".4 9 Even the descriptive additions did not identify clearly the partic-
ular loss, The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals seems to have discovered
why.
"'Loss' is not a word of limited, hard and fast meaning. There
are many kinds of loss, besides money out of pocket. No man would
doubt that he might rightly call a 'loss' that event which changed his
status from solvency to insolvency, and compelled him to go through
bankruptcy or else be unable to own any property as long as he lived.
Indeed, in the strictest sense of the word, the business man against
whom a judgment of this kind became final during a fiscal year, so
that at the end of that period he must carry it on his books as a lia-
bility, would, according to all familiar systems of bookkeeping, enter
it as a loss for that period, and treat it accordingly . " 50
"Weller v. Eames, 15 Minn. 461, 467 (187o).
' Blanton v. Cotton Mills Co., lO3 Kan. i18, 124, 172 Pac. 987, 99o (I918).
"Carter v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 76' Kan. 275, 277, 91 Pac. 178," 179 (i97) ; Griffin v.
Casualty & Surety Co:, 231 Mich. 642, 645, 2o4 N. W. 727, 728 (1925) ; Cayard v. Robert-
son, 123 Tenn. 382, 385, I31 S. W. 864, 865 (191o).
" Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peppard, supra note 4o, at 522, 157 Pac. at Io8.
" Elliott v. Belt Automobile Ass'n, 87 Fla. 545, 546, 100 So. 797 (1924).
' Griffin v. Casualty & Surety Co., suPra note 46, at 644, 2o4 N. W. at 728." Schambs v. Fidelity & Casualt? Co., 259 Fed. 55, 58, (C. C. A. 6th, i9ig).
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To make the problem more difficult for the courts to determine whether
the indemnity was against liability or loss, the policies seem to have been
drawn to savor of both.5 1 And in one case, 2 the court was embarrassed by
the danger of being guilty of the intellectual obtuseness of not distinguish-
ing between "for loss or damage" and "against loss or damage". But, ju-
dicial acumen was equal to the emergency and successfully made the hurdle.
The Prattle About Privity
Bain v. Atkins 53 is one of the most nauseating cases to be found in
the books. Its vicious influence has been far-reaching. Atkins was a con-
tractor and builder in Boston who was protected by an accident policy. One
of his workmen dropped a brick on Bain, a ten-year-old boy, causing serious
head injuries. Bain recovered a judgment of $7000 against Atkins. Nine
days before Bain attempted to liquidate his claim, the accident company
settled with Atkins'for $3000. At the time of the settlement Atkins had
been cited in the poor debtors' court on a judgment of $185 which had
been obtained against him; thereafter he became bankrupt. The question
before the Massachusetts court was: What right has the injured person to
the assets of the accident policy? The court answered "None". Did not
the unsophisticated insurer settle in good faith? 54
"The only parties to the contract of insurance were Atkins and
the company . . .Not only was the plaintiff not a party to either the
consideration or the contract, but the terms of the contract do not pur-
port to promise an indemnity for the benefit of any other person than
Atkins. The policy only purports to insure Atkins and his legal rep-
resentatives against legal liability for damages. . .. It contains no
agreement that the insurance shall inure to the benefit of the person
accidentally injured, and no language from which such an understand-
ing or intention can be implied. Atkins was under no obligation to
procure insurance for the benefit of the plaintiff. . . ." 5
Nevertheless, according to the result of the case, both parties to the con-
tract were permitted by the decision to traffic in the injuries of the boy.
Atkins received $3000 and had paid only the premium on his policy. The
insurer saved $2ooo by the settlement. Pre-Civil War Massachusetts rose
in righteous indignation when the slave owner exploited his slaves by appro-
priating their labor. A generation later, judicial Massachusetts sanctioned
a traffic in the injuries of innocent victims and with ignoble complacency
enshrouded it in the mantle of privity. This is not law. Relieve it of its
tragedy and it is the burlesque of legal pedantry.
I Supra note 49, at 648, 2o4 N. W. at 729.
'Verducci v. Casualty Co., 96 Ohio St. 26o, 268, 117 N. E. 235, 237 (1917).
= Supra note 28.
5 Ibid. at 246, 63 N. E. at 415.
Ibid. 244, 63 N. E. at 415.
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The pious prattle of privity has led many a court "into the impene-
trable fogs of endless palaver". 56 When the assets of an accident policy
were made available to the injured party, a dissenting judge cried out in
pained amazement "then he is the real party in interest". 57 When the court
denied to the injured employee the assets of his employer's policy, a saner
dissenting judge with finer vision said "such a construction of the policy
outlaws it, and the business becomes a menace to industry and a threat to
its employees". 58  He saw the problems of the law as a task in social engi-
neering 59 nor did he approach them with the warped perspective of the
opponent of compulsory liability insurance who dared to assert:
"In my opinion the greatest menace to the institution of private
property, the most insidious assault on private rights, the most far-
reaching invasion of personal liberty ever proposed in this country is
the effort to socialize insurance". 60
Since it is common knowledge that all insurance involves the distribution
of loss among large numbers and is based on the socialized application of
the theory of averages, his superlatives betoken his prejudice rather than his
intellect.
However, it appears that the authorities are quite uniform I" in hold-
ing that there is no privity of contract between the insurer and the employee
or injured person under a policy of indemnity against accident taken out by
the employer or other insured third person for his own protection. Indeed,
it is of no moment that there is no privity, because that is not the decisive
fact. Most of the courts have regarded it as the determining factor.
Whether the injured person is a party to the contract or not is irrelevant.
What the intent of the parties to the contract was is not controlling. It is
assumed that a policy of indemnity against accident is valid. It is also
assumed that the insurer and the insured did not intend to engage in
an illegal transaction. The only construction which could be placed upon
the policy that would sustain its validity is that either the assets of the policy
or an equivalent would be made available to the injured person. It is not a
question of privity; it is a fact conditioning the validity of the contract.
it transcends the contract. What the parties intended is of no conse-
quence. The right of the injured party does not depend upon their in-
tent. It depends upon the limitations which the law has placed upon their
right to contract with reference to the injuries and life of another in order
'M cADoo, WHEN THE COURT TAXES A RECESS (1924) 90.
" Elliott v. Belt Auto. Ass'n, supra note 48, at 56o, ioo So. at 802.
' Supra notes 31, 32.
POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COmmON LAW (1921) 195.
' Ives, op. cit. supra note 26, at 157.
' Stenbom v. Brown-Corliss Engine Co., 137 Wis. 564, 566, li9 N. W. 3o8 (19op).
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that insurance may not be a mere speculation based upon the misfortunes
of the victims, Which are the subject matter of the contract. To say, as
did Mr. Justice Gray,6 2 that an insured employer owes no duty or obliga-
tion to his employee, except those which grow out of the relation of employer
and employee, is absolutely false. He owes the duty not to enrich himself
or his insurer by appropriating the blood money of his employee when he is
legally liable for his injury. Yet, in the light of this duty, one court which
repudiated these decisions which recognized the interest of the injured
party, said:
"It seems to us that their construction of the insurance contract
is dominated by an undue regard for the injured stranger, rather than
by a consideration alone of the intention and the obligations of the
contracting parties. Such insurance contracts as these may be one-
sided and unsatisfactory in their operation, but we know of no prin-
ciple of law or public policy which forbids their operation exactly as
stipulated by the parties, with which . . . a stranger to the contract
has absolutely no concern".
63
The right of the injured party quite clearly does not rest upon the ques-
tion of his being a third party beneficiary. 64 Nor can his right be regarded
as derivative from the terms of the contract because it is an essential con-
dition of it.65 Nor is the benefit indirect or incidental,66 because, unless its
primary object is a dedication of its assets or their equivalent to reimburse
the victim, the policy falls under the condemnation of the law. He is the
real party in interest 67 and the saving of his tort-feasor from damage is,
from a social point of view, but an incident of the transaction. When the
New York statute 68 authorized the employer to take out policies of accident
insurance covering his employees colectively for their benefit, it merely
recognized the only insurable interest which the employer ever had in the
lives of his employees, and relieved the employer of the burden of the risk
of their injury within his employment.
Chief Judge Cardozo has said that "A fruitful parent of injustice is
the tyranny of concepts". 69 Privity has frequently been the source of such
tyranny. Its function seems often to have been to make the law scientific
for the sake of science.7 0  But in recent years an assault has been made
Embler v. Hartford Steam Boiler Co., 158 N. Y. 431, 437, 53 N. E. 212, 213 (1899).
1 Goodman v. Georgia Life Ins. Co., 189 Ala. 130, 133, 66 So. 649, 65o (I914).
Howard, op. cit. supra note 41, at 58.
' WILSTON, CoNTRcArs, § 364.
'Williston, Contracts for the Benefit of a Third Party (1go2) 15 HARV. L. REV. 767,
781. See also German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Home Water Co., 226 U. S. 220, 230, 33 Sup. Ct.
32, 35 (912).
I" Williston, op. cit. supra note 66, at 778.
65N. Y. CONs. LAws (Cahill, 1923) c. 30, § 55. See supra note 62, at 435, 53 N. F_
at 212.
. Supra note 13, at 61, also at 45.
Z Pound, supra note 37, at 6o5.
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upon its ancient citadel. 71  In the past, courts have dealt blunderingly with
the right of the injured party under accident indemnity contracts very much
as the New York Court of Appeals dealt with workman's compensation in
Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co.72 Privity seems to have obsessed them and
induced a mental stupor. The criticism of Ward seems especially appro-
priate:
"Elaborate judicial opinions, as is well known, not only tend to
obscure the subject, but actually befog the judge's mind, divert it from
the central notions of justice or right involved, and lead it to decide
questions wrongly where the truth is intuitively arrived at by
others . ," 78
The intuitive judgment, says Ward, is "popularly called 'common sense'."
Its virtue is that frequently it averts such intellectual catastrophes, which
are so profoundly depressing.
The notion of privity in its essence is merely the subordinating of a
claim as an incident to a relation. The legal relation created by the tor-
tious act of injury never should have been subordinated to the relation of
privity which was established as a protection against the tortious act. The
question of privity was a subordinate question. The social interest in the
life of the victim of the accident transcends the interest which society has
in protecting either the insured or the insurer in the assets, which by virtue
of the tort become available. Under the preposterous claims of privity, the
cost of the policy to the assured is legally more persuasive than the cost of
the accident to the injured. In this judicial assessment, property is valued
more highly than life. The personal quality of privity triumphs. The
application of the doctrine of privity to this problem was thoughtless,
mechanical. But, as Dean Pound says, "The effect of all system is apt to
be the petrifaction of the subject systematized". 74 Then, the barricade of
dead precedents bars social progress.
The Defective Analogy
The real cause of the conservatism of the courts has been attributed
to the inflexibility of the judicial mind and its blindness to the changing
social order, as well as its exaggerated veneration for ancient principles of
law.75  Under the old regime, competitors did not mind any conceivable
Ix CA ozo, GROW H OF THE LAW (1924) 77. See also AMES, Lactms ON LEAL HIs-
TORY (913) 164; Holmes, The Arrangement of the Law--Privity (931) 44 HARV. L. REV.
738, 743.
72o1 N. Y. 271, 318, 94 N. E. 431, 449 (191I). "I know of no principle on which one
can be compelled to indemnify another for loss unless it is based upon contractual obligation
or fault." Cullen, C. J.
7 WARD, PsYcHIc FACTORS OF CIVILZATION (1892) 173.
*' Pound, Liberty of Contract (19o8) 18 YALE L. J. 454, 462.
WmEL, op. cit. supra note 34, at 112.
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waste of human lives. Hugging the illusion of the power of privity, the
drab judicial tragedy of allowing the insurer and the insured to profit at
the expense of their injured victim, merely made certain the triumph of
commercialism. The conception of social justice was the last to develop.
Dean Pound says:
. . as a result of our legal history, we exaggerate the importance
of property and of contract, as an incident thereof . . And our
courts regard the right to contract, not as a phase of liberty-a sort
of freedom of mental motion and locomotion-but as a phase of prop-
erty, to be protected as such. A further result is to exaggerate private
right at the expense of public interest". 76
The merit of the sociological movement has been that it gives the human
factor a dominant position and has demoted logic to its position as an in-
strument.7 Twenty years ago, one writer admonished the courts:
"Let the courts wake up, and not regard so highly the 'business
interests' of the country, especially where such interests are opposed
to the 'safety of the people'. The latter consideration becomes the
'supreme law' of the land which the courts are charged to enforce".78
No one would doubt that accident insurance has the same undisputed social
value as it had in 1864 in Massachusetts when it first made its appearance
as a form of contract insuring the insured against accidents to his own per-
son. 79  The modem accident indemnity policy seems to have had its origin
in England, in i88o, through the passage of the Employer's Liability Act.80
In the United States, this new species of indemnity insurance received an
impetus s1 as a result of the decision of Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Erie Trans-
portation Co.82 The United States Supreme Court held in this case that:
"No rule of law or public policy is violated by allowing a common
carrier, like any other person having either the general- property or a
peculiar interest in goods, to have them insured against the usual perils,
and to recover for any loss from such perils, though occasioned by the
negligence of his own servants. By obtaining insurance, he does not
diminish his own responsibility to the owner of the goods, but rather
increases his means of meeting that responsibility". 3
Although it is admitted that the great majority of the earlier contracts were
contracts of indemnity for loss of property, it has been assumed that the
Pound, supra note 74, at 460.
T Pound, supra note 37, at 6og.
"Robbins, Validity of Indemnity Insurance Contracts (191o) 71 CENT. L. J. 37, 38.
Employers' Assurance Corp. v. Merrill, 155 Mass. 404, 406, 29 N. E. 529, 530 (1892).
' Rhodes, The Liability of Insurance Contract (1911) 4 Mr. L. Ra' 65.
m Collier, The Validity of Contracts of Indemnity for Liability to Third Persons Aris-
ing Out of Negligence (191o) 71 CENT. L. J. 39.
8 117 U. S. 312, 6 Sup. Ct. 750 (1886).
I Ibid. 324, 6 Sup. Ct. at 755.
201
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
same principles are "equally applicable" to indemnity against losses for in-
juries. The defect of the assumption is obvious. Life and property can
not be regarded in the same category. One dissenting judge put the argu-
ment in an extreme form:
"In my opinion it is illegal because it is contrary to public policy
and because humanity cries out against it. You cannot liken this to a
contract of re-insurance against a fire loss, because you can not measure
the master's duty to take care for the life, of his servant by the same
rule of conduct that you measure his right to take care of his property;
you can not measure life against money value".8 5
One may admit the accident indemnity policy to be valid, but it is very dif-
ficult to see how the employer as tort-feasor could appropriate the assets of
the policy at the expense of his victim with the sanction of the law. It is
the more incredible when one learns from the cases that an employer has
an insurable interest in the safety of his employees.8 One would never sus-
pect that it could be made an anti-social source of profit by befogging priv-
ity. But, in the conflict between bad logic and good sense, logic won. It
illustrates, as Laski says, that ideas lag behind the environment of which
they are a part.
8
7
The "No Action" Clause
The earlier forms of policies undertook to protect the insured against
liability for the injury inflicted. 8 Then, although the accident companies
still designated their policies "liability" policies, they were changed so that
the company undertook only to insure against loss from legal liability. Even
these contracts were sometimes construed as indemnity against liability.89
The next step by the accident companies was to insert the "no action" clause.
From the standpoin of the immunity of the insurer, one of the most per-
fect of these clauses reads:
"No action shall lie against the company to recover for any loss
or expense under this policy, unless it shall be brought by the assured
for loss or expense actually sustained and paid in money by him after
trial of issue". 90
Under such a clause, which was very popular with accident companies and
which was adopted generally by them, the insurer was not liable to the as-
" Breeden v. Frankford Marine, etc. Ins. Co., 220 Mo. 327, 347. iIg S. W. 576, 579
(go9).
Vallient, C. J., ibid.
Supra note 79, at 408, 29 N. E. at 531.
8 LASKI, COMU1NISM (1927) 62.
=Note (1925) 37 A. L. R. 644, 645.
Ibid. 646.
"Patterson v. Adan, i19 Minn. 3o8, 314, 138 N. W. 281, 284 (1912).
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sured until the judgment against him was paid.91 And with a few excep-
tions, the courts so held. One court said:
"It may be a surprise to many owners of automobiles to find that
policies such as we now have before us do not afford them the protec-
tion that they supposed they had, but however that may be, we cannot
change the contract between the parties to meet special circumstances,
if the contracting parties have not protected themselves". 92
When it was argued that where the assured was insolvent, the effect of the
"no action" clause, making payment of the judgment a condition precedent,
was to relieve the insurance, company from liability, the court would reply:
"The remedy for that injustice, and we agree that it is a gross
injustice, must come, if at all, though the Legislature or by the fore-
thought of the insured who will see before he accepts the policy that
it is in fact a liability policy as distinguished from an indemnity policy.
As long as the law permits the indemnity policy against loss only and
the assured will accept it, the courts are powerless to change it.".9 3
These are the constructive suggestions of an apparently helpless court. They
relate to the duty of the legislature or of the assured. One is amazed that
the insurance departments of the various states should have been so derelict
of duty as to tolerate such clauses which, by judicial construction, defeated
the very object of accident insurance as a social measure. In spite of the
fact that practically every state has a department of insurance, yet the "no
action" clause was inserted in policies for over twenty years 94 before any
legislative action was taken to nullify it. But the courts failed in their
opportunity for granting immediate aid in furtherance of justice. For
twenty years most courts impaled their victim upon the "no action" clause.
When the insurers changed the wording of their policies in an attempt to
make them valueless in event of the insured's insolvency, one court chuckled
in gleeful admiration "Vigilantibus, non dormientibus, leges subvenient".9 5
It merely gave expression to the average man's weakness for subtlety and
ingenuity, his feeling that law is a mysterious technicality,9 6 when it is merely
a travesty on justice.
However, at the hands of a few courts, the "no action" clause fared
badly. Practically all policies reserved to the insurer the right to defend all
actionsY' In 19o4, about the time when the problem of the right of the in-
"CooLmy, op. cit. supra note i6, 5696.
London & Lancashire Indemnity Co. v. Cosgriff, I44 Md. 66o, 667, 125 Atl. 529, 532
(1924).
w Staggs v. Gotham Mining Co., 208 Mo. App. 596, 6oo, :235 S. W. 511, 512 (1921). See
also Most v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 196 S. W. i064, io65 (Mo. App. 1917).
"*Beacon Lamp Co. v. Travellers Ins. Co., 61 N. J. Eq. 59, 62, 47 Atl. 579, 581 (0900).
Poe v. Philadelphia Casualty Co., ii8 Md. 347, 355, 84 Atl. 476, 479 (92).
"Pound, supra note 37, at 6o7.
"Note (920) 6 A. L. P- 376, 383.
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jured to the assets of the policy became vital, the New Hampshire court 98
passed on the question. To it the sole question involved was: By an agree-
ment to defend all actions under the policy did not the insurer assume all lia-
bility? After an analysis of the meaning of the word "defend",99 the court
concluded by a none too convincing argument that it did. In 1912, the Min-
nesota court reached the same result, 100 adding:
". ..but if, under the pretense of an insurance obligation, the com-
pany carried on litigation in the name of one who has neither voice
nor interest therein, and which does not affect the company itself, be-
cause the assured is unable or unwilling to pay if plaintiff is awarded
judgment, it would seem that the company becomes an officious inter-
meddler. Public policy does not permit a litigant to so surrender con-
trol of his lawsuit to one who has no interest in the cause of action." 11
The rule laid down in these two cases has been followed in a few juris-
dictions 102 and has received legislative approval in many states, but the
great weight of authority is against it.103  But, what is the "great weight
of authority"? Often it is but a "great cloud of dust" that the courts kick
up by following each other so blindly.1°4
The New Hampshire rule has been much criticized.10 5 The majority
rule has been praised for being more logical.1 06 The minority rule has been
called more equitable, though it was denounced as bad law.107 Perhaps the
critic would have been nearer the truth if he has said that the result was
good but the rationalization was bad. Mr. Justice Burch exposed the weak-
ness of the New Hampshire decision when he said: 105
' Sanders v. Frankfort, etc. Ins. Co., 72 N. H. 485, 57 Atl. 655 (1904).
Ibid. 496, 57 Atl. at 658.
' Supra note go.
'Ibid. 313 138 N. W. at 283.
Elliott v. Belt Automobile Ass'n, supra note 48; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peppard,
supra note 4o, at 52r, 157 Pac. at io8; Davies v. Maryland Casualty Co., 89 Wash. 571, 155
Pac. 1035 (1916). Also approved by Nunn, J., dissenting in Fidelity & Casualty Co. v.
Martin, supra note 31, at 36, 173 S. W. at 316; and Doerfler, J., dissenting, in Glatz v. Gen-
eral Acc. F. & L. Assur. Corp., supra note 39.
"' VANcE, op. cit. supra note 20, at 685.
"' Robbins, op. cit. supra note 78, at 37.
'Allen v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 145 Fed. 881, 883 (C. C. A. 3d, 1906); Goodman v.
Georgia Life Ins. Co., supra note 63, at 132, 66 So. at 650; Campbell v. Maryland Casualty
Co., 52 Ind. App. 228, 232, 97 N. E. 1o26, i28 (i912) ; Carter v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., supra
note 46, at 279, 91 Pac. at 179; Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Martin, spra note 31, at 29, 173
S. W. at 314; Poe v. Philadelphia Casualty Co., supra note 95, at 358, 84 Atl. at 48o; Con-
nolly v. Bolster, 187 Mass. 266, 269, 72 N. E. 98I, 982 (i9o5) ; Most v. Mass. Bonding &
Ins. Co., supra note 93, at 1o65; Cayard v. Robertson, supra note 46, at 388, 131 S. W. 865;
Combs v. Hunt, 14o Va. 627, 641, 125 S. E. 661, 665 (1924) ; Glatz v. General Acc. F. & L.
Ass. Corp., supra note 39, at 48, 183 N. W. at 685.
S(1917) 2 MIxN. L. REV. 216, 218.
(915) 2 VA. L. REV. 475, 476.
m Emerson v. Western Auto. Indemnity Ass'n, O5 Kan. 242, 245, 182 Pac. 647, 648
(1919).
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"After accident, an automobile owner is not grievously concerned
about either legal liability or expenses so long as an insurance company
must pay the bills. To protect itself against indifference, improvidence,
and even collusion and downright fraud, the insurer is obliged to un-
dertake the defense, and make its own outlays for expenses. Under
these circumstances, the insurer is not put to any election to forego
these protective measures, or to give up writing indemnity policies."
Although one must admit the validity of this observation, one can not feel
that Mr. Justice Burch has approached the problem from a helpful point of
view when he says that "An automobile owner may take or leave such a
policy." Contrasted with the sympathetic approach of Professor Vance,102
one feels convinced of it.
"This state of the law undoubtedly permitted grave abuses; fur-
thermore it offends the common sense of justice to see an insurance
company escape liability merely because the assured is unable to satisfy
the judgment, when the insurer is usually regarded as the principal
debtor within the limits of the policy, and the assured a mere conduit
through whom. the money passes. It is not surprising that many at-
tempts have been made by a sort of subrogation to substitute the
assured's victim to the assured's right against the insurer freed from
the condition of prepayment."
The majority rule, which has been praised so highly for its logical quality,
at least exposes ihe courts to attack for their mental sterility." 0  The mere
fact that the injured party was usually left penniless by the courts when
a policy, which was an asset of the assured, was declared valueless, is of
itself an indictment of their failure to achieve justice.
Satisfying the Condition Precedent
The "no action" clause was clearly designed to make payment of the
judgment after trial a condition precedent "' to the duty of the accident
company to indemnify the insured. When the assured was insolvent and not
able to pay the judgment, the problem which confronted the injured party
was: How could he make the assets of the policy available?
i. By garnishment. The "no action" clause made the policy one of
indemnity against loss, requiring the judgment to be satisfied by payment.
Without doing violence to the language of the policy, it could not be con-
strued as an indemnity against liability which would make the assets of the
policy subject to garnishment as a sum due to the assured under the policy."
2
Op. cit. supra note 2o, at 684.
"o Pound, op. cit. supra note 37 at 614.
'Employers' Liability Assur. Co. v. Fredette, 3 D. L. R. 64, 66 (1923), (1923) 29
REv. LEa. (. s.) 93, 95.
Melukhova v. Employers' Liability Assur. Co., 66 D. L. M 609, 617, 63 Can. S. C. P,
511, .25 (1922) ; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peppard, supra note 4o, at 521; Boling v. Ash-
bridge, iii Okla. 66, 238'Pac. 42r (1925).
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The garnishment could not change the contract between the assured and
the garnishee. 113  No money was due to the assured until the condition had
been satisfied. 114  For the injured person to maintain garnishment proceed-
ings against the insurer, the insured must have had a subsisting right of
action at law," 5 for it is a fundamental doctrine of garnishment that the
plaintiff acquires no greater rights against the garnishee than the defendant
himself has." 6  The garnishee has the same defense against the plaintiff
which he could plead if action were brought against him directly by the prin-
cipal defendant on the claim. 17,
Since under the theory of garnishment the only issue is whether the
garnishee was indebted to the principal defendant," 8 it is amazing that so
many proceedings in garnishment should have been brought against the in-
surer by the injured party to obtain the assets of a policy which contained
a "no action" clause. 1 9 Defeat was inevitable unless the court was willing
to nullify the "no action" clause on the erroneous theory of the New Hamp-
shire and Minnesota cases, that by undertaking the defense of the action
the insurer is estopped from denying that the indemnity policy was for in-
demnity against liability. However, dissent against denying recovery in gar-
nishment is frequent.' 20  One dissenting judge favored recovery in garnish-
ment because, excepting for the purpose of preventing collusion between
the assured and the injured party, the "no action" clause was a trick on the
part of the insurer, a dishonest scheme to avoid liability when the assured
was insolvent.' - '
Doubtless the assets could be reached by garnishment where the waiver
of the condition precedent makes the policy one of liability, 22 or after settle-
ment where the condition is that the indemnity shall not be payable until the
loss or damage has been adjusted and settled by the company. 123  Similarly,
recovery is allowed by an injured employee in garnishment proceedings
against the insurer, where the policy is one against liability for damages.'
2 4
SDRA.E, ArACHMENT (7th ed. i8gi) § 517.
"' VANCE, op. Cit. supra note 2o, at 683.
SHINN, ATTACHMENT AND GARNISHMENT (1896) § 516.
International Harvester Co. v. Hanson, 36 N. D. 78, 83, I6I N. W. 6o8, 6og (917);
Baker v. Eglin, ii Ore. 333, 334, 8 Pac. 280 (1883). See also Garnzishment (I916) 12 R. C.
L. § 29.
KRIEDLER, GARNISHEa EXECUTION AND SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEED[NGS (1920) 4.
" Smith v. Houston Nat. Ex. Bank, 202 S. W. ISI, 183 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918).
Allen v. Aetna Ins. Co., supra note 105; Scheuerman v. Mathison, 74 Ore. 40, 144 Pac.
1177 (1914) ; Combs v. Hunt, supra note 1O5; Luger v. Windell, 116 Wash. 375, 199 Pac. 760
(1921) ; Glatz v. General Acc. F. & L. Assur. Co., supra note 39.
'Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Martin, supra note 31.
' Melukhova v. Employers' Liability Assur. Co., supra note 112, at 611, 63 Can. S. C. R.
at 515.
'Dunham v. Philadelphia Casualty Co., 179 Mo. App. 558, 565, 162 S. W. 728, 730
(1913).
Stephens v. Penn. Casualty Co., 135 Mich. 189, i9o, 97 N. W. 686, 687 (1903).
'Fritchie v. Miller's Penn. Extract Co., 197 Pa. 401, 47 Atl. 351 (I9O).
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2. By attachment. The "no action" clause makes the right of the
assured contingent upon the satisfaction of the condition of payment of the
judgment. Some courts refuse to allow a contingent interest to be sold
under an attachment. 12  It has been held that in order to subject a right of
the debtor in proper proceeding to satisfy a claim of the creditor the money
must be due or become due, subjec to no other condition than the lapse of
time.126 Abstractly it is said to be unjust that a creditor should seize and
destroy an interest of his debtor which is so uncertain that it can not be fairly
sold. 127 Such an argument would seem to have no validity when an injured
person attempted to attach and sell the policy of the assured in order to
subject the assets to payment of the judgment. The value of the policy would
be dependent upon the credit of the insurer. So it would seem absurd to
consider that the assured's interest was so contingent as not to be subject
to levy by attachment.12  Practically the adaptability of the remedy invoked
ought to determine whether a contingent interest may be subjected to the
claim of the creditor.' 29  In Oregon, by statute, 1 30 a casualty or indemnity
policy is subject to attachment upon execution issued on the judgment of the
person who has suffered the injury or damages.
3. By execution. The mortgagor of land is the possessor of what is
called an "equity of redemption". It is often regarded as an interest in land
which is dependent upon a condition, the payment of the amount of the
mortgage within a certain time. In 1803, in a Connecticut case,' 31 the ques-
tion was: Can the "equity of redemption" be seized on execution? The
court's answer was that it is the policy of the law that every species of prop-
erty should be liable for the payment of a man's debts; a Montana statute
so declares.13 2 If the indemnity policy may be seized as an asset and sold on
execution, if the judgment debtor purchased it, his judgment would be sat-
isfied to the amount of his bid. 3 ' The right of action upon the policy
against the insurer would then be perfected, because the appropriation of the
policy as an asset of the debtor would satisfy the judgment as well as the
condition precedent, imposed by the "no action" clause. The English court
had the power, in its discretion, to allow execution.'14  But the very idea
=Frederick v. Chicago Metal Co., 22i App. Div. 588, 589, 224 N. Y. Supp. 629 (1927),
Finch, J., dissenting, rev'g i3o Misc. 366, 223 N. Y. Supp. 824 (1927). See N. Y. C. P. A.
§Si6.
Overturf v. Gerlach, 62 Ohio St. 127, 129, 56 N. E. 653 (igoo).
"TWhat contingent interests may be reached by a creditors' bill? Note (igio) 27 L. R.
A. (N. s.) 454.
"I Stagg v. British Controlled Oilfields, Ltd., 117 Misc. 474, 480, 192 N. Y. Supp. 596
(192).
=Supra note 127, at 455.
1Opy. CoDE ANN. (ig3o) § 3-109.
Punderson v. Brown, I Day 93 (Conn. 18o3).
Raymond v. Blancgrass, 36 Mont. 449, 464, 93 Pac. 648, 653 (9o8).
=FmXEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) § 1139.
4In re Harrington, Motor Co., supra note 35, at 120, 59 A. L. R. at 1120.
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of allowing execution against the insurer, where the policy was one of in-
demnity against loss, was so revolting to its moral sense that it refused
because "it would be wrong to allow execution to issue". Whoever pur-
chased a policy, if it were subject to being seized upon levy of execution,
would unite in himself the rights of both the creditor and the debtor. In
that event, there would seem no doubt that the insurer would have to pay
the policy.135 To refuse to allow the execution was to deny that the policy
was an asset of the assured, which is folly.
4. By assignment. An indemnity policy with a "no actio" clause is
an asset of the assured even prior to payment of the judgment.""0 By the
ancient common law, things in action were not assignable.13 7  This was con-
sidered
. .. the great wisdom and policy of the sages and founders of
our law, who have provided, that no possibility, right, title, nor thing
in action, shall be granted or assigned to strangers . . .
Pomeroy says that the "perfection of human wisdom" of Lord Coke was
semi-barbarous even in Lord Coke's day.'3 ' By a wisdom less ancient, now
all claims and choses in action are assignable, particularly where the only
obligation is to pay money.1 40  A policy under which a loss has occurred,
but which has not yet been paid by the assured, so as to perfect the right
of action under it is more than a mere hope of acquiring future property.' 4 1
It is an inchoate right.
Under the modern doctrine, one of the incidents of a chose in action is
the right to assign it.1 42 -Any provision that its assignment, after the insurer
becomes liable under it, shall invalidate the policy, is void. The law favors
assignments by which the assets of insolvent debtors may be distributed
among their creditors. 143  To prohibit an assignment of the policy of the
assured after liability attached would mean its loss to creditors and ought to
be held void. In Georgia, the statute declares that after loss, -the transfer
of the policy shall not affect the liability of the insurer. No right of the
insurer can be affected by it and hence it would be a mere act of caprice and
'Scott v. Purcell, 7 Blackf. 66, 68 (Ind. 1843); Campbell v. Lowe, 9 Md. 5oo, 5o8
(1856) ; Travellers Ins. Co. v. Moses, 63 N. J. Eq. 260, 262, 49 Atl. 720, 721 (igoi) ; Wood
v. Jackson, 8 Wend. 9. 37 (N. Y. x83) ; Clark v. Bonsa, 157 N. C. 270, 273, 72 S. E. 954,
955 (IgI1) ; Briley v. Cherry, 13 N. C. 2, 5 (1828).
Garetson-Greason Lumber Co. v. Home L. & Acc. Co., infra note 178, at 530; Clark
v. Bonsai, supra note 135. But see Illinois Tunnel Co. v. General Acc. F. & L. Ins. Co., 219
Ill. App. 251, 253 (920).
PomEaoY, EQ. JuRis. (4th ed. igig) § 1270.
'Lampet's Case, io Coke 46, 48a (1o Jac. i).
"' PomERoy, op. cit. supra note 137.
"' Costigan, Doctrine of Boston Ice Co. v. Potter (19o7) 7 Co. L. REv. 32, 33; Assign-
mens, 5 C. J. (i916) §31.
PomERoY, op. cit. supra, note 137, at § 1286.
Alkan v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 53 Wis. 136, i44, io N. W. 91, 91 ({88i).
" Infra note 145. See also supra. note 124.
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bad faith to withhold consent in order to defeat the claim of the assignee.144
Any express provision against assignment is null and void, as an illegal
restraint on alienation.145 On that sharp condition, the company can not
impale the assignee. 146
In Davies v. Maryland Csualty Co.,147 the Washington court said
there is a difference between the injured party who has been assigned the
indemnity policy by the assured in payment of his judgment and who then
sues to recover on the policy, and the injured party who prior to payment of
the judgment attempts to collect from the company as garnishee. In the
one case, the condition of the "no action" clause has been satisfied; in the
other, it has not been satisfied. Five years later, in Luger v. Windell,' 48 the
same court denied that any such distinction exists. The denial seems dog-
matic. The distinction clearly exists, but the court seemed unable to per-
ceive it.
5. By payment swith note. In Davies v. Maryland Casualty Co.,' 49 the
plaintiff's husband, who was a miner, was 'killed in the course of his em-
ployment. The coal company was protected by a policy of indeinnity against
loss. After prolonged litigation (nearly two years), a judgment of $17,000
was obtained against the coal company. It was then insolvent; it had no
assets. The coal company executed notes for $I7,OOO to satisfy the judg-
ment, which was discharged. The notes were surrendered on the same day
they were given in consideration of the assignment of the rights of the
coal company under the indemnity policy. When the widow, as assignee,
sued upon the policy, the court called this transaction a subterfuge.150
Repeatedly, it has been held that where a note is given by a debtor in
satisfaction of an obligation, it is deemed a payment of it.' 51 Payment need
not be made in money or property ;152 it may be made by note. When pay-
ment is made by note, there is no error in excluding evidence of the insolv-
ency of the maker, when he sues upon a contract of indemnity"1' 3 Has the
debtor, who is insolvent, suffered a loss by making payment by note?
Much of the judicial nonsense on this question, which has gained con-
siderable currency, came from a Wisconsin case, which was decided in i9o9.
Georgia Co-op. Ass'n v. Borchardt & Co., 123 Ga. I8I, 183, 5I S. E. 429, 430 (igo5).
"VANcE, op. cit. supra note 20, at 642.
West Branch Ins. Co. v. Helfenstein, 40 Pa. 289, 299 (i86i).
"89 Wash. 571, 578, x54 Pac. I16 (i9i6).
Supra note 1g,.at 379, 199 Pac. at 761.
Supra note 147.
wIbid. 573, x54 Pac. at 1117. On rehearing, the court affirmed a recovery by the
widow, but shifted the grounds of its decision.
SE-vicx, DAMAGES (9th ed 1912) § 798. See also Gardner v. Cooper, 9 Kan. App.
587, 58 Pac. 228 (i899) ; Atkinson v. Stewart, 2 B. Mon. 348, 349 (Ky. 1842) ; McLellan v.
Crofton, 6 Greenl. 307, 314 (Me. i83o) ; Bausman v. Credit Guar. Co., 47 Minn. 377, 379,
50 N. W. 496 (i8gi) ; Witherby v. Mann, ii Johns 518, 52o (N. Y. 1814).
1Flannagan v. Forrest, 94 Ga. 685, 21 S. E. 712 (1894).
'
13 Wilson v. Smith, 23 Iowa 252, 256 (1867).
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In Stenbom v. Brown-Corliss Engine Co., 154 an employee had recovered
a $ioooo judgment against his employer for personal injuries suffered by
him. The Engine Company, which had a "no action" indemnity policy to
protect it, was insolvent; later it was adjudicated a bankrupt. After the
employee's judgment was obtained, a receiver of the judgment debtor was
appointed. He filed a petition in the bankruptcy court, requesting that the
indemnity policy be assigned to him by the trustee in bankruptcy. The
petition was granted. The receiver gave to the injured employee his note
for $5000 in satisfaction of the judgment, which was discharged. Action
was then begun on the policy. After much prating about privity, the Wis-
consin court denounced the action as "a novel proceeding".
"On its face the action taken was a mere subterfuge resorted to
for the purpose of making a nominal compliance with the terms of the
insurance contract. The contract was one which the parties thereto
had a right to make, and it would be trifling with its terms for a court
to hold that the shadowy payment here attempted to be made conformed
-to its requirements. . . . The fictitious payment resorted to is too
thinly veiled to stand the test of judicial scrutiny." 155
If the trustee in bankruptcy had done what the receiver did, the estate would
have realized on the policy as an asset. It was the duty of the trustee in
bankruptcy to make the assets of the estate available to its creditors.' 5
Such a decision ignores, with perverse blindness, that the policy was an
asset 157 of the bankrupt. If the condition precedent could be met, the money
could be made available. The trustee in bankruptcy as assignee of the policy
would have the same right to satisfy the condition of the policy by paying
the judgment by note as the assured would have had. The puerile fallacy
of the Wisconsin case is that the court thought the value of the policy, as
an asset of the assured, depended upon the solvency of the assured, when
in fact, under a system of credit, it depended upon the solvency of the
insurer.
How sadly the Wisconsin court suffered from a "jurisprudence of con-
ception" is illustrated in Eberlein v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.,'"8 in which the
court followed the Stentbom case. An injured employee recovered a judg-
ment of $15oo from his negligent employer, a corporation which was insured
by a "no action" indemnity policy. The employer became bankrupt prior
to the liquidation of the employee's claim. It was admitted that the unliqui-
137 Wis. 564, ii9 N. W. 3o8 (igog).
'Ibid. 568, ii N. W. at 3o9.
Melukhova v. Employers' Liability Assur. Co., supra note iI2, at 617, 63 Can. S. C.
R. at 525.
' Emerson v. Western Auto. Indemnity Co., supra note lO8, at 246, i82 Pac. 649; Fuller
v. N. Y. Fire Ins. Co., i84 Mass. 12, 14, 67 N. E. 879, 88o (1903) ; Newton ve Seeley, 177
N. C. 528, 529, 99 S. E. 347 (i9ig). See also Howard, op. cit. supra note 41, at 58; supra
uote 136.
164 Wis. 242, 159 N. W. 553 (1916).
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dated claim was not provable in bankruptcy and that the indemnity policy
did not pass as an asset of the bankrupt to the trustee in bankruptcy.15 In
order to satisfy the judgment and meet the condition of the policy the treas-
urer of the corporation borrowed $15oo from the bank to pay the judgment
for which he gave the note of the corporation under a resolution specifically
authorizing him to do so. The money so received from the bank was depos-
ited with the bank in the name of the assignee of the employee to be held
by the bank as security for the payment of the note of the employer, which
the assignee of the employee endorsed. The assignee of the employee dis-
charged his judgment. Was this payment of the judgment? The court
held that it was not. To hold otherwise, said the court, is "to make sub-
stance out of shadow". 160 The obtuseness of the court consists of its inabil-
ity to perceive that a solvent assignee is entitled to loan his credit to make
available the assets of the policy held by an insolvent debtor. Mr. Justice
Holmes cites with apparent approval the practice of the master who penalized
his valet whenever he showed a lack of imagination.16' What is to be done
with judges who exhibit the same mental defect? This case is the more
remarkable because it involved the right of an employee to recover from his
employer for injuries due to negligence and because it was written by Chief
Justice Winslow five years after his famous decision 102 sustaining the valid-
ity of the Workmen's Compensation Act. That decision Dean Pound said 163
was the beginning of "something very like sociological interpretation" in
this country. The prattle about the absence of privity between the insurer
and the injured employee as well as the prattle about the shadow of sub-
stance in payment of a judgment by note shows little comprehension of the
issues involved in the Eberlein -case. In the light of the able opinion in
Borgnis v. Falk Co.,'6 4 sustaining workmen's compensation, the distin-
guished chief justice was guilty of displaying the product of a mind which
was at least momentarily compartmental. When one reviews the judicial
decisions of the first quarter of the century on the right of the injured person
in an indemnity policy, and then finds a statement by a prominent professor
of law that by 1925 the accident companies had recognized the social pur-
pose of indemnity insurance 165 by inserting a proviso that the company
will pay the injured person, even though the insured becomes insolvent or
bankrupt and does not suffer a loss, by-payment of the damages, one feels
that the author of such a statement is ill-informed.
Ibid. 245, I59 N. W. at 554.'1bid. 246, 159 N. W. at 554.
m HoLmES, Cowxrw PAPERs (1921) 201.
"Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 133 N. W. 2o9 (1gI).
10 Pound, Courts and Legislation (913) 7 Am. POL. ScI. REV. 361, 380.
'Supra note 162.
m Chamberlain, Insurance for the Benefit of Third Persons under Statute (925) 1i A.
B. A. J. 84.
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The decisions in the Wisconsin cases are not only specious, but inde-
fensible. Fortunately, Wisconsin represents the distinctly minority view.
Some cases make a feeble attempt to distinguish the Wisconsin cases. 166
The effective answer to the insurer's defense of payment by note as a sub-
terfuge is that:
"While it might be contended, by way of argument, that the method
of arranging this whole matter was only consistent with some pre-
arranged plan to avoid the terms of the policy, yet, the pith of the ques-
tion is in the validity of the note as a claim legally collectible . . 167
from the assured. Discounting a note at a bank by the assured to pay a
judgment which will make the assets of the indemnity policy available is
merely a commercial transaction in the ordinary course of business.
When the assured is insolvent and he has paid the judgment against
him by note, the gist of the insurer's defense on a "no action" policy is
usually a lack of good faith.' When the assured is solvent and he has paid
the judgment by note, the gist of the insurer's defense on a "no action"
policy is generally that there has been no loss to the assured. Even though
the note was not secured, yet if the assured had sufficient property out of
which to pay it, it must have been given in good faith. 16 In order to realize
on a "no action" policy, the assured is not obliged to wait until his property
is seized on levy of execution on the judgment and his business destroyed.
Satisfaction of the judgment by a note is sufficient. When the assured gave
its note to the injured employee in satisfaction of his judgment and agreed
to use the assets of the indemnity policy to pay the note, it agreed to do
only what it was its duty to do.169 There is no impropriety in giving the
injured party the benefit of the insurance. When a judgment has been
obtained by the injured party and the only question is as to the method of
its satisfaction, it is difficult to see how the question of good faith in dis-
charging the judgment by note is material, where the judgment is actually
discharged.
"It is no answer to say that the note may never be paid at all, or
that it may be compromised and settled for less than its full amount
after the assured is reimbursed by the surety company. This can hap-
pen no matter how the note is paid. Had the assured paid the judgment
in cash out of its own funds, .or paid it in money borrowed from an-
other, there could be a secret agreement to repay it, or some part of it,
to the assured after the collection is made from the insurance company.
But this is beside the question." 170
Herbo-Phosa Co. v. Philadelphia Casualty Co., 34 R. I. 567, 579, 84 Ati. 1093, IO98
('9Ibid. 579, 84 Atl. at io98.
Taxicab Motor Co. v. Pacific Coast Casualty Co., 73 Wash. 631, 635, 132 Pac. 393, 395
(1913).
Standard Printing Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 138 Minn. 304, 307, 164 N. W. io22,
1023 (1917).
1 1 Supra note 168.
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The impeachment of the assured's good faith appears in juvenile form in the
argument of the insurer's counsel in Hoagland Wagon Co. v. London Guar-
antee & Accident Co.,' 7 1 a Missouri case. An employee of the Wagon
Company had recovered judgment of $5660 against his employer, which
was protected by a policy indemnifying against loss. The Wagon Company
had made an assignment of its assets for the benefit of creditors. Besides
the judgment, it owed $45o0 and had only $3000 in assets. Thereafter, it
borrowed $5660 from a third person on its note and paid the judgment of
the injured employee. In an action on the policy, the insurer contended that
to borrow money to pay the judgment was "a fraudulent creation or accel-
eration of the loss" by the assured .1 72 that good faith required the assured
should not expose the insurer to jeopardy or wilful loss by wilfully borrow-
ing the money to pay the judgment. To this pathetic argument, the court
replied:
"It is with very poor grace that the defendant (insurer) urges that
the plaintiff (assured) should not have paid this judgment. A court of
last resort had adjudged the judgment to be a just one and that it
should be paid. Instead of permitting the plaintiff to pay the judgment,
the defendant used all the means at its command to prevent its payment,
evidently knowing that it would be the final loser."
In an Iowa case,17 3 an insured employer borrowed $4247 at a bank and
pledged to two stockholders $8ooo in book accounts who pledged their stock
to the bank to secure the payment of the note which was given for the loan,
in order to get the money to pay its injured employee's judgment. The in-
surer contended that the employer would suffer no loss until the loan, which
the note represented, was paid. The court held that since the judgment had
been paid, it was no concern of the insurer whether the note was paid, even
though the stockholders who gave the security might be the losers. 114 If a
stockholder loans $2000 to a corporation to pay the judgment -of an injured
employee, even after an assignment has been made for benefit of creditors, it
is immaterial to the insurance carrier how and where the corporation
obtained the money or on whose credit it was obtained, when the judgment
has been satisfied.17 5 If some one were to give the money to the assured,
even if the assured were hopelessly bankrupt, the court would not inquire
into the motive of the generosity of the assured's benefactor.' 78  When the
assured has in fact paid the judgment, the insurer can not challenge his good
'71201 Mo. App. 490, 212 S. W. 393 (1919).
11 Ibid. 498, 212 S. W. at 397.
'71 West Riverside Coal Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 155 Iowa 161, 135 N. W. 414
(1912).
171Ibid. 164, 135 N. W. at 415.
3n Frank & Co. v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 175 Cal. 293, 298, 165 Pac. 927, 930
(97). But see Campbell v. Maryland Casualty Co., supra note 105.
"" North Am. Accident Ins. Co. v. Newton, 57 Can, S. C. 577, 6 A. L. R. 1236, 1237
(ii8).
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faith, by proof that the assured borrowed money to pay it." 7  The assured
may borrow the money from whomsoever it chooses, even the surety who
executed a bond on appeal from the judgment against the assured." s In
order to obtain the loan, it may give as security for its note the indemnity
policy.17 Even though the assured uses his daughter-in-law's money to
pay the judgment, he has suffered a loss by the payment.' 80 Where the
administrator of the assured pays the judgment, the court will not inquire
whether the administrator had the power to execute a note to obtain the
money with which he paid the judgment to determine whether the estate
of the assured suffered loss.""-
The stupid perfection of classical refinement was reached by an Illinois
court,'1 2 as late as 192o. The. Tunnel Company, an employer, was pro-
tected by a "no action" policy. Two of its employees suffered injury by
accidents covered by the policy. On execution against the Tunnel Company,
the return of nulla bona was made. Thereafter, the Tunnel Company went
into the hands of a receiver, in the foreclosure of a mortgage to secure $3o,-
ooo,ooo worth of bonds. At the foreclosure sale, the property was pur-
chased for $5,ooo,ooo, although the obligations of the Tunnel Company
exceeded $4o,oooooo. The Utilities Company, which was organized to
hold the assets of the Tunnel Company, which were purchased at the sale,
because it feared the judgments of the employees might jeopardize their
franchise gave $ioooo to the Tunnel Company, which was paid to the two
injured employees, together with an assignment of the indemnity policy, in
full satisfaction of the judgments. The court refused to allow a recovery
on the policy in an action brought in the name of the Tunnel Company. The
court said.'
"At the time the judgments. were satisfied it was impossible for
the Illinois Tunnel Company to sustain a loss for it had nothing to lose.
It was entirely out of business and hopelessly insolvent. While it has
been said that the insurance company cannot question where the money
comes from, it has further been said that the payment must be in good
faith and there must be in fact a loss and not merely a pretended loss
as a result of some collusion between the assured and another." 183
The denial of a recovery seems to have been placed on the basis that the
judgments were satisfied solely because the Utilities Company desired to
' Campbell v. London & Lancashire Indemnity Co., 168 N. Y. Supp. 300, 301 (1917).
' Garetson-Greason Lumber Co. v. Home Life & Acc. Co., 131 Ark. 525, 199 S. W. 547
(1917).
Ibid. .59, 199 S. W. at 548; Hoagland Wagon Co. v. London Guaranty & Acc. Co.,
supra note 171, at 500; 212 S. W. at 397; Schambs v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., supra note 5o,
at 59.
mLewinthan v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 61 Misc. 621, 113 N. Y. Supp. 1O31, 1O32 (1909).
Am. Indemnity Co. v. Fellbaum, 225 S. W. 873 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
' Ill. Tunnel Co. v. General Ace. F. & L. Ins. Co., supra note 136.
Ibid. 266.
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remove a cloud from its franchise. The Supreme Court of Illinois denied
a petition for certiorari in this case,184 yet it is to be said to the credit of
the lower court that there was one dissenting judge, who apparently did not
agree that to allow a recovery "would be a travesty on justice" nor with
the seven pages of prattle of privity with which the court bewildered itself
and burdened the books.
What is the source of confusion of the majority view? Quite dearly,
it is the conviction that there is a valid distinction between liability and loss.
Nothing is more obvious than that the traditional distinction is as formal as
it is artificial. In this modem commercial age, when credit is the very essence
of commercial enterprise, to assert that a liability is not a loss is to exem-
plify the subtlety of a sophist. To prevent the assured from paying a judg-
ment by borrowing money and giving a note would smack of the restraint
of primitive law. It would nullify the value of a "no action" policy as an
asset of the assured. It would nullify a well-established principle, now fol-
lowed in a majority of jurisdictions, that a debtor may satisfy a judgment
against him by his note. A judgment is a secured liability; a note is an
unsecured liability. If one satisfies a judgment by paying it with a note,
although the judgment is merely a liability, and not a loss until it is paid,
payment by note converts it into a loss. How potent is the magic of a note
to convert a liability into a loss ! Legally, a liability is not a loss. Exchange
for the liability on a judgment a liability on a note, and the second liability
in the sequence becomes a loss. The courts failed to recognize how specious
was the distinction between a loss and a liability, the absurdity of which any
system of credit was bound to expose. That failure was the cause of many
victories by the accident companies. That deceptive distinction shackled the
mentality of the courts which gave it currency.18 5 To inaintain that a note
given to pay a judgment is not a loss would mean that the assured could
never transact business on credit under a policy of indemnity against loss.
To befog the issue with accusations of a lack of good faith, as did the Wis-
consin court, reveals the mental obscurity of the court. To maintain that
there is any substantive difference between the loss due to a liability in-
curred by a note and the liability incurred by a judgment is the artifice of
an analytical mind. It is too formal to command serious consideration
despite its ancient traditions. Just how the exchange of a judgment for a
note can taint the transaction with bad faith is not clear,'80 when the only
result seems to be to require the insurance company to pay in accordance
with the formal terms of its policy and to make available immediately the
assets of the policy of indemnity against loss. When one learns that "not
Supra note 25, at 457.
GLENN FRANK, TomoRRow's BUSINESS (i930).
' Standard Printing Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., supra note 169, at 3o6, 164 N. W. at
1023; Riner v. Southwestern Surety Co., 85 Ore. 293, 3o2, I65 Pac. 684, 687.
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only the weight of precedent but also the weight of reason gives support to
the doctrine that the making and delivery of a note may be a loss actually
sustained", 8 7 the "no action" policy becomes as a basis of credit, an asset of
the assured, made immediately available by a formal device. By "the weight
of precedent and the weight of reason" all judgments may be discharged by
notes and all liabilities under a policy of indemnity against loss may be con-
verted into losses. The lack of stability of the distinction between a loss
and a liability is seen in such a statement as this:
"The execution of a note in exchange for satisfaction (of the
judgment) is in legal effect equivalent to the exchange of property
therefor. It confers a right to invoke legal process to seize and levy
upon property in value equal to the amount of the note . , 188
Of course, so would any liability, when matured, create the same right.
A Florida decision illustrates the weakness of the distinction between
a loss and a liability, when it says:
"We cannot see how the plaintiff below (assured) could have
alleged, that he had sustained any loss, if the policy is good for any-
thing, unless the unpaid judgment against himic6nstitutes a loss. What
other loss could he have sustained? If the answer be, 'that he must
have paid the judgment' that would not be a loss, if the policy is with
a responsible company. Paying the judgment would be not a loss, but
a mere outlay of money that would promptly be repaid to him by the
insurance company. At least, the insurance company says it will do so.
"Money paid to satisfy a judgment, is not a loss, if a responsible
person is obliged to reimburse the one against whom the judgment is
held and who pays it." 189
This argument appears, at first sight, to be specious, but it is not. If the "no
action" policy is an asset in the hands of the assured, he can borrow money
on it. If the insurer is responsible, there is no reason why the policy as a
security should not be equal to the liability of insurer on it up to its face
value. In the cases, 190 the insurer repeatedly admits that when the assured
is solvent and can readily satisfy the judgment, the company pays the judg-
ment without the formality of having the assured pay it. If the policy is
worth the amount of the judgment up to its face value in negotiating a loan
to pay the judgment against the insured, then the transaction, which has
given the courts so much difficulty, is open to the classic criticism of the
Washington court.
2'T ote (1I916) 83 CENT. L. J. 357, 358.
Seattle & S. F. Ry. & Nay. Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 5o Wash. 44, 47, 96 Pac.
5o9, 51 (i9o8).
aB'Sukra note 48, at 547, ioo So. at 797.
'm Patterson v. Adam, supra note 90, at 313, 138 N. W. at 284; Glatz v. General Ace. F.
& L. Assur. Co., supra note 39, at "45, 183 N. W. at 684.
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"The judgment has established that claim. Nothing remains ex-
cept a form. The casualty company in effect says . . . that, if the coal
company (employer) will pay her at one end of the desk, the casualty
company will pay the coal company at the other end. Not one thing
besides, does it argue, is wanting to its liability except this formula.
On that process it insists, not because when the coal company shall have
first paid and the casualty company shall then have given reimburse-
ment there will result to it a right, claim or even a salvage interest
against the coal company or its assets, but because it wishes the thing
done in just that way. It will pay a moment after, not a moment be-
fore, the coal company pays. If the latter will get a loan for a few
moments from some one else and pay the judgment, then the casualty
company will hand it a check, perhaps long previously prepared.
"Such mummeries are ill-favored by the law. Technicality, in-
deed, is not only respectable, but is enforced by courts when even a
remote right is exposed to danger. When technicality is invoked, how-
ever, to avoid an obligation morally established, the common law
usually finds in its arsenal some weapon with which to confront it and
to make that a legal which is already a moral debt." 191
No finer indictment of judicial obtuseness is to be found in the books. Even
the Washington court itself caught but momentarily a glimpse of light. It
still had faith in legal formalism of primitive quality. With little tribute
to its creative genius, in a later case, 192 it unanimously repudiated this deci-
sion, because it was unable to perceive any difference between the right of
an injured party to the assets of a "no action" policy when he proceeds by
way of garnishment and when he proceeds on the policy as assignee of it
after his judgment has been discharged.
No genius is required to perceive that if the assured can give his note
for a loan, with the policy as security, in order to satisfy the condition im-
posed by the "no action" clause, he can give his note to the injured party,
with the policy as security, to secure the discharge of the judgment to satisfy
the condition. If this conclusion is correct, since the policy is an asset, the
assured can assign it directly to the injured in satisfaction of the judg-
ment,19 3 thereby satisfying the condition precedent imposed by the "no
action" policy. To deny that he can do so, is to deny either that the "no
action" policy is an asset of the assured or that all the assets of the asstred
should be appropriated to the discharge of the assured's debts.
6. By payment, not in cash. Following the suggestion of some ill-
considered dicta of a New Jersey case,19 4 decided in i9oI, the accident
Davies v. Maryland Casualty Co., supra note 147, at 574, 154 Pac. at 1118.
u2Luger v. Windell, supra note iig, at 379, 199 Pac. at 761. See also (1921) 6 MIum.
L. REV. 77.
u' Rodgers v. Pacific Coast Casualty Co., 33 Cal. App. 70, 74, 164 Pac. 1i15, 1116 (1917).
Contra: Hebojoff v. Globe Indemnity Co., 35 Cal. App. 390, i69 Pac. 1048 (917).
2" Travelers Ins. Co. v. Moses, supra note 135. See also Riner v. Southwestern Surety
Ins. Co., supra note 186, at 3O, I66 Pac. at 687.
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companies incorporated in their "no action" clause the requirement that the
assured must pay the judgment "in cash" or "in money" as a condition
precedent to reimbursement under the indemnity policy. Even a recent
writer seems to have succumbed to the potency of this indefensible fal-
lacy.' 90  He characterizes it as one "of particular importance." Few courts
have been so unimaginative as to be impressed by its importance. How-
ever, one finds -n acute, literal-minded California court warmly supporting
.he condition as one of the substance.
"Should we construe the term not to be one of the substance of
the contract and permit the loss to be recovered regardless of the kind
of property which the assured parted with, then it might happen that
the latter had paid in land, jewelry, or other merchandise, and thus an
issue would arise as to the actual value of the thing given in payment
of the obligation against which indemnity was claimed. We have no
doubt at all that an insurer can by the condition of its contract relieve
itself from difficulties which might attend such a defense in an action
upon its policy." 196
It may be that one may contract with another to pay an obligation due to
him only in cash or a given kind of money. But, such an argument when
applied to an accident policy neglects to consider the interests of the injured
party, who is entitled to have the assets of the policy appropriated to the
payment of his judgment, according to law. His legal rights to its appro-
priation can not be limited by any contract between third parties. It is a
matter of no moment to the insurer whether the payment was made in
money, property or other obligations. 197 Payment by note shall be deemed
the equivalent of payment in cash.' 98 It is as if the money had actually
been advanced. 9" Indeed, on this question, only the Missouri court seems
to have been guilty of lending the weight of its influence to exalt form
over substance in law.200 However, even the Missouri court lent dignity
to the exaltation only by a divided court.
So painful have been the arguments in behalf of the distinction, that
counsel have urged that payment by check for a note is not payment unless
the judgment is paid in money.20' However, the argument failed of suc-
cess. Payment by warrant is treated as payment in cash,202 just as ispay-
-Supra note 42; note (1924) 24 Coi. L. REv. 173, 175.
"* Hebojoff v. Globe Indemnity Co., supra note 193, at 393, i69 Pac. at 1O49.
1Ralston v. Wood, 15 Ill. 159, 172 (1853).
'Lee v. Clark, I Hill 56, 58 (N. Y. 1841).
Cox v. Reed, 27 Ill. 434, 437 (i862) ; Pearson vi Parker, 3 N. H. 366, 369 (i826).
See also SEDGwicx, DAMAGES, § 796.
' State ex rel. Western Auto. Ins. Co. v. Trimble, 297 Mo. 659, 670, 249 S. W. 9o2, 9o5
(923).
2n St. Louis Screw Co. v. Mastin, 253 S. W. 96 (Mo. App. 1923). See also, Lyon v.
Northrup, 17 Iowa 314 (1864).
Pasewalk v. BolliMan, 29 Neb. 519, 529, 45 N. W. 780, 783 (1890).
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ment in county bonds.2 0 3  Any bona fide payment of a claim in any prop-
erty is payment in money.2 0 4  If it were not, when the injured person exe-
cuted upon the property of the assured and it was sold to pay the judg-
ment, the assured might not recover on a policy which required the judg-
ment to be paid in cash; if the injured party bought the property, the judg-
ment would never be paid in cash. No court which has passed upon the
question of a loss, as a result of execution upon a judgment, has ever given
currency to the folly of the Missouri court and denied that it was a loss in
money.
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7. By the aid of equity. The function of equity is to provide a rem-
edy where the common law procedure is not sufficiently elastic, 200 on the
theory that justice should be done when the common law does not furnish
an adequate remedy. 0 7 There are numerous cases where equity has reached
a debtor's choses in action when a judgment can not be otherwise satis-
fied by execution. 20 8 The New Hampshire doctrine has been explained on the
theory that where the insurer defends an action for the assured and judg-
ment results, in equity,2°0 the insurer becomes the principal debtor to the
injured employee. Not only was it equitable that the assets of the "no
action" policy, or their equivalent should be applied in satisfaction of the
damages suffered by the injured person, but to the extent that courts tacitly
permitted or openly encouraged a diversion of. those assets, or their equiva-
lent, they stimulated diabolical speculation in the lives of innocent victims.
When under the obsession of privity, courts of equity declared that the in-
jured employee had no legal or equitable interest in the indemnity policy of
his employer,210 those courts demonstrated their intellectual unfitness to deal
with the problem. The majority of courts denounced the New Hampshire
doctrine because it did "not seem to rest on any definite principle".
21 1
For the most part, that meant that the injured party was a stranger to the
contract. When it was urged upon the Alabama court 212 that the interest
Wilkinson v. Stewart, 30 Ill. 48, 58 (1862).
-- sSupra note 178, at, 530, 199 S. W. at 548.
21 McBride v. Aetna Ins. Co., supra note 42, at 534, 19i S. W. at 7; Upton Cold Storage
Co. v. Pacific Coast Casualty Co., 162 App. Div. 842, 846, 147 N. Y. Supp. 765, 768 (914) ;
Stag Mining Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., supra note 43, at 324; McKenna v. International
Indemnity Co., 125 Wash. 28, 29, 215 Pac. 66 (1923) ; Komula v. General Acc. F. & L. A.
Corp., Ltd., 165 Wis. 520, 524, 162 N. W. 919 (1917).
WuLLISTON, op. cit. supra note 66, at 773.
Boyd, The Economic and Legal Basis of Compulsory Industrial Insurance of Work-
men (1912) IO MicH. L. REV. 345, 349.
" PomERoY, EQ. Juais. § 2300.
21 Coo=, op. cit. supra note 16, 5704; Sanders v. Insurance Co., supra note 98, at 500,
57 Atl. at 66o.
m Kinnan v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., supra note 22, at 410; Fidelity & Casualty Co. v.
Martin, supra note 31, at 20, 173 S. W. at 31o; Bain v. Atkins, supra note 28, at 244, 63 N. E.
416; Burke v. London Guar. & Acc. Co., 47 Misc. 171, 93 N. Y. Supp. 652, 653 (1o5) ; Ford
v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 7o Wash. 29, 36, 126 Pac. 69, 71 (1912).
=' Burke v. London Guar. & Acc. Co., supra note 210.
Supra note 63, at 132, 66 So. at 649.
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of the injured person was a dominant consideration, the dogmatic court
exclaimed, "This theory can find no support in any principle of law or equity,
and is too untenable for serious discussion". Yet, Vice Chancellor Pitney
of New Jersey perceived the interests of the injured employee with clearer
vision.
"The real and only meritorious condition precedent of the lia-
bility to payment is the suffering of injury by the employee and the
recovery of judgment therefor . . . in which the insurance company
shall have the opportunity to conduct the defence . . . The actual
payment of the money by the defendant in the judgment to the injured
employee has in it nothing meritorious, and does not touch the real
consideration of the contract."
2 13
Contrary to the majority of the courts of equity, it seems plainly equitable
that the policy should be regarded' as an asset which should be dedicated
to the payment of damages suffered by the injured person. In New Hamp-
shire, in order order to realize substantial justice equity disregards the for-
mality of procedure, ignoring all discussion of legal justice as serving no
useful purpose.
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The desire of the Massachusetts court of equity to do justice is seen
in Connolly v. Bolster.' :" It was a suppressed desire. The injured plaintiff
prayed that a receiver be appointed in order that he might borrow money to
satisfy the condition precedent of the "no action" clause. But the conscien-
tious court was powerless because the statute did not authorize a court of
equity "to complete inchoate rights so as to create property which would
then be the subject of trustee process in an action at law".
The passive attitude of most courts of equity is exemplified by a Penn-
sylvania decision.2 16  The injured employee prayed that he be subrogated
to the rights of his bankrupt employer under a "no action" policy which it
held. With marvelous brevity, the court solved its difficulty, without reflec-
tion, by ignoring it. Since the employer had paid nothing, by the express
terms of the contract, it was entitled to nothing. This was a court of equity
in name only; in fact it was merely a court of very limited comprehension. If
as a condition of the subrogation of the employee, the court had required
the employee to discharge his judgment as a consideration for the policy as
an asset, the condition of the policy would have been satisfied. Where an
injured plaintiff can not attach or reach a policy on levy of execution, why
should not a court of equity aid him in making the policy available as an
asset? If an execution-proof employer refused to assign his indemnity
policy, the only asset he had, in satisfaction of the judgment against him,
Beacon Lamp Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., supra note 94, at 68, 84 At. at 583..
n 4 Lombard v. Maguire-Penniman Co., 78 N. H. iio, III, 97 Aft. 892 (i916).
2'Connolly v. Bolster, supra note io5, at 271, 72 N. E. at 983.
Pfeiler v. Penn Allen Portland Cement Co., 240 Pa. 468, 470, 87 Atl. 623, 624 (1913).
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would a court of equity compel him to do so? Would a court of equity
compel the insured employer to execute his note to discharge the judgment
and to assign the policy as a security for the note? If it would not, then
equity relies on form and not on substance. If it would not, then an em-
ployer can make the policy available, as an asset, to his debtor by volun-
tary execution of a note to satisfy the judgment, but a court of equity
is impotent to deal with an unwilling debtor, who seeks to defeat his in-
jured creditor, maimed by his negligence. In dealing with these cases,
courts of equity have not been courts of justice. Fortunately, a more re-
cent Pennsylvania decision 216a seems to make further appeal to a court of
equity unnecessary. Regarding the "no action" clause merely as a sort of
"joker", Pennsylvania has endorsed the Minnesota view.
The Kentucky court superficially justifies 217 the insurer in inserting
a clause requiring payment of the loss by the assured as a condition prece-
dent to an action against it so "as to prevent itself from being subrogated
to a loss which an insolvent assured was relieved by his insolvency, from
paying." Such an observation is not even intelligible, when the insolvent
can borrow on his note and give the policy as security for its payment in
order to meet the condition of the policy.
In 191o, an Ohio court repudiated 218 the idea that there was anything
to which an injured person could be subrogated when the assured was pro-
tected by a policy of indemnity against loss. By some strange irony, sub-
sequently, the Ohio legislature declared that the injured employee should
be "subrogated" 219 to the rights of the insured employer under the policy
and so the Ohio court "subrogated" him, because it would be "monumental
folly" not to "subrogate" him when the statute said that he was to be
"subrogated".22 ° Perhaps, the use of the word "subrogate" is not wholly
fortunate, 221 but whatever word one uses it requires no peculiar power of
penetration to know that, even if the injured acquires no greater rights than
the assured, when he is "subrogated" to the rights of the assured, he unites
in himself the interest of debtor and creditor. He is in exactly the same
position as he would be if the policy had been assigned to him. Even to
insist that he must satisfy the judgment before he can recover on the policy
would be to say. that as assignee he must pay himself in order to recover.
These cases would seem to show that at the most courts of equity have
been absorbed with the mummery of form when they assert that a court
of equity can no more disregard the express provisions of a contract than
4West v. McMillan, 301 Pa. 344, 152 AtI. io4 (I93O). For comment, see (193r) 79
U. OF PA. L. REv. 982.
m Supra note 31, at 29, 173 S. W. at 314.
m Garrett v. Travelers Ins. Co., 17 Ohio C. C. (x. s.) 197 (1913)..
OHIO GEN. CODE (Throckmorton, 1926) § 9510-1.
= Verducci v. Casualty Co., supra note 52, at 264, 117 N. E. at 236; see also Ill. Indem-
nity Exchange v. Indiana Com., 289 Il. 233, 236, 124 N. E. 665, 667 (919).
2 WiUsToN, COxRACTS, § 384.
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a court of law.; The 'oily difference between loss and liability is the formal
difference of converting one into the other by means of a note, -or more
directly by an assignment of the policy. For when an assured assigns his
policy to his injured creditor to satisfy his judgment, he suffers a loss be-
cause he loses his policy, an asset that he, as an honest judgment debtor,
was bound to use to pay the judgment against him. To allow the policy
to be used to satisfy the judgment is not, by whim of the court, to defeat
the purpose of the contract, 222 but it is to refuse to allow the condition prece-
dent to obstruct reaching a valuable asset of the debtor by an emphasis of
form. Clearly, from the commercial, as well as the social, point of view
it is not an essential condition as frequently declared,22 however much
mere legalism may exalt it, as the courts have exalted it in the past.
2 24
Viewed in this light, although the New Hampshire doctrine, as a ration-
alization, was maladroit and may be condemned as "a strained construction
of a contract" by the interpreter who suffers from the obsession that the law
of contracts shall dominate the law and be kept inviolate, it is eminently
sound in its fine disregard of procedure at the expense of a just result. It
repudiates the procedural niceties of the mechanical judicial process.
22 5
Its social attitude enabled the New Hampshire court to make the law equal
to the emergency of justice.
The Rights of General Creditors to Share Blood Money
Where the estate of the assured is insolvent, if the proceeds of the acci-
dent policy are made available in the liquidation of the- bankrupt's estate,
should the assets be distributed equally among the assured's creditors? The
answer to the question would seem very simple, but in the few cases found
on the point, the court has never given the seemingly simple answer. In-
stead of granting relief to the maimed victim of the assured's negligence
it has expressed its deep sympathy, because it saw no alternative. If the
assured could not profit by an indemnity contract, the subject of which
was the negligent injury of his victim, how could his general creditors have
any greater right than the assured would have in appropriating the assets
of the policy? The courts assume that the bankrupt's assets should be dis-
tributed equally among his creditors. 22 , Where an employee loses his right
hand through his employer's negligence, probably he must share the pro-
ceeds of his insolvent employer's indemnity policy with the other cred-
itors . 2 7  The fallacy of any such monstrous result underlies the attempt
Scheuerman v. Mathison, supra note i19, at 49, 144 Pac. at 1179. But see Cushman v.
Carbondale Fuel Co., 122 Iowa 656, 657, 98 N. W. 5o9 (i9o4).
2Supra note 63, at 131, 66 So. at 649.
* Ford v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., supra note 210, at 34, 126 Pac. at 70.
= PouND, op. cit. supra note 59, at 128, 184.
In re Harrington Motor Co., Ltd., supra note 35, at 11I, 59 A. L. R. at m4.
=7Supra note IIi,'at 67,29 RPrEv LEG. (N. s.) at 5.
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to sustain the validity of accident insurance in the life of another by the
argument that it increases the ability of the assured to pay.22 8 If the assured
does not in fact pay the assets of the policy or their equivalent, it is a spe-
cious argument that sanctions the appropriation of the benefits of the policy
by the cupidity of the assured and his general creditors at the expense of
the assured's victim.
Another reason for requiring the victim to share with the creditors
the blood money, is that the assured does not need to pay his injured victim
the actual assets of the policy; it would satisfy the law, if he paid the
injured person the equivalent, out of any resources he may have.2 9  The
assignee of an insolvent assured is trustee for his creditors.ano In Re
Harrington Motor Co., Ltd., a recent English case, all the judges of a
court of equity deplored the necessity of sacrificing the victim, while they
distributed the proceeds of the bankrupt's indemnity policy equally among
the assured's creditors. 231  They deluded only themselves when they said
thdy could not avoid it. To say that the assets of an accident policy, when
the victim of the accident has not been paid for his injuries, is a general
asset of the assured's estate, is to profane the law and to make human
parasites out of creditors. A promise to pay the debt of another is a val-
uable right of the debtor which can not be taken on execution against a
promisee ;232 but a promise to indemnify against injuries from accident suf-
fered by an innocent victim has to be deemed a general asset of the assured
and must be distributed among all creditors. Such a result values property
more highly than life and is so contrary to the common sense of sensible
people as to shock their sense of decency. Yet, this was the issue in Bain
v. Atkins, but the Massachusetts court repudiated the contention of counsel
because in its essence it made the assets of the policy "a trust fund for the
payment" of the assured's victim. Such a contention seemed so absurd to the
court, it was considered groundless.
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When a mortgagor covenants to insure the mortgaged premises for
the benefit of the mortgagee, he may not profit by his wrong if he breaches
his covenant. Not to give him an equitable lien would be a violation of the
first principles of equity.2 34  Is the duty imposed by a covenant any greater
than the duty of a wrongdoer not to profit by the injury which he inflicts
2 American Casualty Ins. Company's Case, 82 Md. 535, 576, 34 Atl. 778, 785 (1896) ;
Messersmith v. Am. Fidelity Co., 232 N. Y. 161, 164, 133 N. E. 432, 433 (1921). The fal-
lacy had its origin in the erroneous deduction from the passage quoted. See supra note 83.
=Supra note 35, at 118, 59 A. L. R. at 1118.
2' Bankruptcy or insolvency of insured as affecting right of person injured to proceeds
of indemnity insurance in absence of provision in policy in that regard, Note (1929) 59 A. L.
R. 1123, 1124.
= Supra note 35, at 127, 59 A. L. R. at 1124.
"' WilasToN, CoNTRAcrs, § 362; Williston, op. cit. supra note 66, 776.
2' Supra note 28, at 243, 63 N. E. at 415. Cited with approval by Rhodes, supra note 8o,
at 72.
=' Ames v. Richardson, 29 Minn. 330, 13 N. W. 137 (1882).
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upon another? The difference lies in the magic of the word "privity". Two
states, by statute protect the insurance on the life of the assignor from the
cupidity of creditors.s 5 Common decency ought to preserve to an injured
victim the assets by which the estate of the assured is enriched by the injury
which he inflicts. When the English court of equity recently refused to
distinguish it from general assets, by making an exception of an accident
indemnity policy as an asset, it expressed the hope that the law would be
altered by legislation.23 6 Proposals have been made in the House of Com-
mons to make the insurance company trustee of the proceeds for the injured
person.2 37  In 1914, Massachusetts enacted a statute, which gave to the
injured party a lien on the assured's policy of indemnity which a "no action"
clause could not defeat.238 But, in 1925, the Massachusetts court held that,
even though the judgment of the injured party had not been paid, the assured
could recover the assets of a policy. The theory of the court was that the
statute gave the injured party a temporary lien upon the insurance money,
if he desired to use it, but that did not prevent the insured from recover-
ing on the policy without paying the judgment. In other words the assured
could divest the lien of the injured party on the proceeds of the policy by
action upon it.239 The quarter, of a century which has elapsed since its
decision in Bain v. Atkins does not seem to have intensified the apprecia-
tion of the Massachusetts court of the problem by which it was confronted
nor to have clarified its comprehension of its difficulties. Under the guise
of logic, the dogma of a medimval ghost still ruled it from the mists of
antiquity, despite the social consequences.240
Unsophisticated Practices of the Insurer
In a Washington case,241 the assured was protected by a $5ooo acci-
dent policy. The plaintiff, who was injured through the negligence of the
assured in the operation of his automobile, recovered a judgment against
him for $4325, which the assured was unable to satisfy because he had
no property. Two days before the action was begun by the plaintiff, the
insurer gave $850 to the assured to cancel the policy. The insurer thought
it had made $415 o by the cancellation. Of course, although there was no
privity between the insurer and the injured party, where the policy was made
for the benefit of the injured party, the insurer could not avoid liability
CAL. Civ. CoDE (Kerr, i92o) § 3470; Hawkins v. McCalla6 95 Ga. 192, 193, 22 S. E.
141, 142 (1894).
"' Supra note 35, at I16, 59 A. L. R. at Im7.
2n Third Party Insurance (1929) 168 L. T. 400.
'Lorando v. Gethro, 228 Mass. 181, i86, IX7 N. E. I85, 187 (1917).
Lunt v. Aetna Ins. Co., 253 Mass4 6io, 612, 149 N. E. 66o, 66, (1925).
21 Oliphant & Hewitt's Introduction to RuFxF, FROM THE PHYSICAL TO THM SOCIAL
SClxNCES (1929) xxvii.
M Finkelberg v. Continental Casualty Co., 126 Wash. 543, 219 Pa=. 12 (1923).
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that way. In a Tennessee case,242 the assured employer got $50 in settle-
ment of all liability of the insurer on a policy, although the employee was
unable to collect a $iooo judgment against the assured for his injuries. The
assured only made a profit of $50 by his negligence, because he had not given
the required notice. Equity approved the settlement which enriched the
wrongdoe. There was no fraud because there was no privity between the
injured party and the insurer. In a Virginia case,243 the insurer settled a
$5732 liability with the assured for $:ooo, but the insurer was so slow in
making the settlement with the execution-proof assured, that the assured
made only $2ooo and the insurer only $1732 because it had to pay an addi-
tional $2ooo, the amount of the settlement. Equity affords no hope for the
injured employee, where the insurer settles with the insolvent employer, even
though both profit by the settlement.2 44  Because of privity, the employer
does not insure for the benefit of the employee; he insures only for his own
enrichment. Why should an employee complain in a court of equity if the
insurer makes his judgment for damages due to personal injuries valueless by
making a good settlement with the employer? The insurer's liability was
to the employer, who had an insurable interest in the life of the employee.
If the employer merely negligently killed him, the insurer should settle with
the employer for the law of privity so prescribes. Moreover, the employer
was not bound to insure against negligently disposing of his employees that
way. If the assured is insolvent; the insurer argues that it ought not to be
required to pay because there is no loss 24 5 -but if it wishes to enrich the
assured by a voluntary settlement of its liability, the law ought not to curb
its freedom of settlement by denying that privilege. Doubtless, the insurer
has often suffered from the lack of scrupulosity of the "ambulance-chasing"
lawyers,240 but it has seldom been with the aid of the courts. When courts
encourage insurance which brings insurer and assured in privity and then
because of privity allow both to profit at the expense of the victim of the
negligence of the assured, they must perceive their judicial tasks with a
vision, obscured by formalism and unguided by the imagination.
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In a Missouri case,248 the insurer advised the assured employer to cir-
cumvent the payment of the judgment of the injured employee by fraud-
ulently running the business in the name of one of its stockholders. In a
Kansas case,2 49 a physician, who had an earning power of $40oo and was
aFinley vr. United States Casualty Co., 113 Tenn. 592, 83 S. W. 2 (1904).
Combs v. Hunt, supra note So5.
Owens v. Jackson-Hinton Gin Co., 217 S. W. 762, 764 (Tem. Civ. App. 1920).
Herbo-Phosa Co. v. Philadelphia Casualty Co., supra note 166, at 572, 84 Atl. at io95.
Reid, Casualty Insurance (1928) Am. YEAR BooK 365, 366.
27 Cardozo, Law and the University (1931) 47 L. 'Q. REv. g.
m Hoagland Wagon Co. v. London Guar. & Acc. Co., supra note 171, at 499, 212 S. W.
at 397. See also Melukhova v. Employers' Liability Assur. Co., supra note 112, at 614, 63
Can. S. C. R. at 52o.
2' Emerson v. Western Auto Indemnity Ass'n, supra note io8.
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protected by a $2500 accident policy, went into voluntary bankruptcy to
avoid liability on the policy after a judgment for $25oo had been secured
against him. The insurer's attorneys represented the assured in the bank-
ruptcy proceedings. In New York, after the insurer had represented to the
tax commission that its policy afforded the protection required by the stat-
ute, in an action on the policy of insurahce, it denied that the policy could
be so construed. 25 0  The state superintendent of insurance of New York
recommended certain legislation:
". .. . in order to eliminate evil, which was becoming a general practice
among insurance companies: i. e., the practice on the part of insurance
companies with assureds . . . to put the assured through bankruptcy,
thereby precluding a recovery on the part of the injured by reason of
the fact that an execution against the assured would be returned unsat-
isfied and the company then standing on a technical construction of the
policy could claim, that, since it was an indemnity policy for loss occa-
sioned to the assured, the assured having sustained no loss, there was
nothing which the company could be legally called upon to pay." 51
The shortsightedness of the courts gave currency to such collusion. The
courts might easily have realized the result the statute accomplished, by
forestalling the defeat of the rights of the injured victim by an adjudica-
tion in bankruptcy of the assured and have prevented the injustice which
has so frequently outraged common sense.. When the United States Su-
preme Court upheld the constitutionality of the New York statute, Chief
Justice Taft said: 252
"the legislature might have required that policies of this kind should
subrogate one injured and recovering judgment against the assured
to the right of the latter to sue the company on the policy. It would
simply create a secured interest in the recovery on the policy for the
benefit of the injured person when ascertained."
Indeed, without a statute, the injured person might have been subrogated
to the rights of the assured on condition that he discharge his judgment to
the extent of the value of the policy; or the assured might have been com-
pelled to assign the policy to the injured victim in satisfaction of the judg-
ment to the extent of the value of the policy; or if it could have been
reached by execution or attachment, it might have been seized and sold to
satisfy the judgment. Clear thinking, guided by a sense of justice, should
have enabled the courts to do what Chief Justice Taft said the legislature
I0 Devlin v. New York Mutual Casualty Taxicab Ins. Co., 123 Misc. 784, 787, 2o6 N. Y.
Supp. 365, 368 (1924).
'a Roth v. National Auto. Mutual Casualty Co., 202 App. Div. 667, 669, 195 N. Y. Supp.
86s, 867 (1922).
Merchants Mutual Auto. Liability Ins. Co. v. Smart, 267 U. S. 126, 131, 45 Sup. Ct.
320, 321 (1925).
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might do, a quarter of century *before he said it. Had the courts recog-
nized their opportunity, there would have been no incentive for the in-
surers to call the policies "liability" policies when they sold them 253 and
"indemnity" policies when they were asked to pay them; nor would the
insurers have been, tempted to escape liability, after agreeing with the em-
ployer to defend at its own cost, by not giving a bond on appeal from an
adverse decision. 254
Workmen's Compensation
The vicious influence of the artificial distinction between "liability"
and "loss" has nullified in part the benefit of workmen's compensatiQn acts.
According to Bradbury, in 1917, most of the policies taken out by employers
contained the "no action" clause. 2z5  When the employer became insolvent,
or bankrupt, so that he could not pay the judgment for damages, rendered
on account of the injury or death of the employee, the insurer entirely
escaped liability. With judicial sanction, ill-conceived, the insurance com-
panies almost universally took advantage of the situation whenever possible.
By statute, in some states, the insurer was required to assume a direct lia-
bility to the injured employee.2so Even today, a small minority of the states
seem to give adequate protection to the injured employee by securing to him
the assets of his employer's insurance policy.? 7  In California 258 and Min-
nesota, 259 the employee has a lien on the policy. Indeed, without a statute,
he always had a primary interest in the assets of the policy, Bain v. Atkins
to the contrary notwithstanding. In at least two. states, the industrial com-
mission or commissioner of labor may enforce the policy for the benefit of
the employee.200  As recently as 1922, the United States Bureau of Labor
Statistics reported as a result of state investigations that the profits of the
insurer made by "short-changing" practice amounted to millions of dollars
annually.2"' Under any scheme of accident indemnity against injury, the
Blanton v. Cotton Mills Co., supra note 45, at 123, 172 Pac. at 989.
Staggs v. Gotham Mining Co.; Most v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., both supra
note 93.
BRAEu Y, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (3d ed. 1917) 1163.= Ibid. 1174.
7 CAr. GEN. LAWS (Hening, 1920) Act 2781, § 30 (b); IDAHO COMP. STAT. (1919)
§ 6282; MD. ANN. COD (Bagby, 1924) Art. ioi, § 30; Mica. CoMP. LAWs (1929)
§ 8461 (2) ; N. Y. ANN. CONS. LAWS (Cahill, 193o) c. 66, § 54; UTAH COmp. LAvS (1917)
§ 3116; Wis. STAT. (1929) § 102.30. See also The Cascade, 241 Fed. 2o6 (E. D. N. Y. 1916) ;
United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Indiana Acc. Com., 195 Cal. 577, 234 Pac. 369 (1925) ;
Matter of Aioss v. Sardo, 249 N. Y. 270, 164 N. E. 48 (1928) ; Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. House,
191 S. W. 155 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917). See also 2 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAW (1922) §481.
CAL. GEN. LAWs, supra note 257, at § 30 (d).
MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 4289.
' MD. ANN. CODE, sispra note 257, at §§ 29-31; N. Y. ANN. CoNs. LAWS, supra note 257.
In Ohio, all judgments obtained in any action prosecuted by the board or state under the
act shall have the same preference as judgments rendered on a claim for taxes. OHIO GEN.
Com, (Throckinorton, 193o).§ 1465-77.
-' COMPARISON OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION INSURANCE AND ADMINISTRAT0U (1922),
BULLETIN NO. 301, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 15.
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securing of compensation to the injured is, and always has been, from a
social point of view, the dominant consideration. 26 2  The legal test of the
right of security of the individual to his physical integrity is the same for
every citizen, whether he is an employee under workmen's compensation or
merely an unoffending pedestrian. Befogging obscurity in the judicial mind,
induced by privity, does not palliate the evil of permitting either the insurer
or the assured to profit by their traffic in human life, regardless of its par-
ticular status, be it in a humble or in an exalted station, if an efficient admin-
istration of justice is to obtain.
Modern Legislation
Because of the remarkable growth of accident insurance in the last
decade,263 it is not surprising that in many states, unusual activity has been
manifested in an attempt, not only to secure financial liability of negligent
operators of automobiles, 2614 but also to nullify the privity-induced folly of
those judicial decisions which declared that the property interest of the
assured and his creditors far outweighs the interest of society in securing
to the maimed and his dependents compensation for the wrong negligently
inflicted upon him, by securing to him the assets of *the policy, the existence
of which depended upon his life, and liability under which depended upon
his injury. Much of this legislation represents merely a statutory repeal
of "the narrowly limited legal science, indifferent to, even intolerant of light
from without" which those decisions embodied.2615 In 1925, when the va-
lidity of compulsory automobile insurance was doubted, the Massachusetts
court discovered that the business of accident indemnity was of such a
peculiar nature and so intimately connected with general welfare that the
constitution permitted the accident. policy to be enforced for the benefit of
the victim of the assured's negligence.20 6 This discovery was very remark-
able, in the light of the fact that, in 19o2, the Massachusetts court thought
it was absurd to even argue that the injured party had any equitable right
to the assets of such a policy. Of course, it does not seem so absurd when
one learns that of all the accident policy premiums paid by 30 per cent. of
the owners of automobiles, who are insured,2 7 only from 25 per cent. to 30
per cent. of the premiums for such insurance ever reaches the victims of
the accidents. 26 8  According to Dean Pound, the law does not create inter-
ests; it merely recognizes them. In 1925, the Massachusetts court merely
recognized what it ignored, under the camouflage of privity, in 19o2.
Ibid. 18.
'*Reid, Casualty and Miscellaneous Insurance (1926) AM. YFAR BOOK 483.
Reid, Casualty and Miscellaneous Insurance (1927) Am. YEAR BooK 337, 338, (1929)
Am. YEAR BOOK 355, 357.
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i. Indemnity bonds required from motor carriers for hire. Legisla-
tion requiring indemnity bonds from all motor carriers for hire has become
a common guaranty to insure the financial responsibility of the carrier.269
These statutes were enacted for the benefit of persons who were injured by
the operation of the vehicles,2 70 although some argue that it was only for
the benefit of the traveling public. 271 The statutes are generally sufficiently
broad to cover all cases of injury to pedestrians as well as to passengers.
272
They transcend the limitations of privity.2 7 3 Nor is the insurer or the
assured readily able to denude himself of liability to the injured 274 for the
courts now recognize the injured victims as the real parties in interest, whose
rights can not be evaded on technical grounds.2 7 5
2. Insurer not relieved by bankruptcy or insolvency of assured. When
the insurer could evade all liability, with the approval of the majority of
courts, by the bankruptcy of the assured, it was an incentive to the insurer
to profit by the specious philosophy of the courts that an insolvent can suffer
no loss when he can not pay. To avoid the senseless result at which the
courts arrived, by disregarding the policy as an asset of the assured when
he is insolvent, statutes have been enacted in a few states within the last
ten years which provide that the insolvency or bankruptcy of the assured
shall not release the insurer from any payment for which it would other-
,vise be liable under the policy 6  These statutes have nullified the vice of
many ill-considered decisions. In some states, the workmen's compensation
acts include such a provision precluding the release of the insurer from
liability on account of insolvency or bankruptcy of the assured.
27 7  It is
particularly interesting to note that, after nearly two decades Wisconsin re-
pealed, by legislation, 278 the judicial fallacy of the Stenbom Case, in part
at least.
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. In 1914, Massachusetts enacted a statute 27" by which the liability of
the insurer became absolute under any policy of insurance against loss on
account of bodily injury or death by accident. Satisfaction of the judg-
ment by the assured was not necessary to enable recovery on the policy. In
an action on the policy, this statute, which has been copied in other states,
2 0
made the question of the assured's insolvency irrelevant. Its object was
to protect the beneficial interest of the person injured.
3. Injured victim given right of action on policy. Under the work-
men's compensation acts, many states gave the injured employee a direct
action against the insurer to recover his compensation.2 8 1  In Rhode Is-
land 282 and Wisconsin,2 13 the insurer is made directly liable to the injured
party in all accident policies. The insurer may be joined with the assured
in the original action by the injured party.2 4 In Oregon, if the judgment
against the assured is not paid within thirty days, the injured party may
proceed against the insurer to collect it.28 5  Such a provision seems superior
to the insolvency clause inserted in some statutes because no dispute can
arise as to when a person is insolvent.
2 6
4. Agreement to cancel policy forbidden. Under the Massachusetts
statute of 1914, the legislature forbade the insurer to cancel or annul the
policy by any agreement with the assured after he had become responsible
for any damage, covered by the policy. 2 1 This provision was declared to
be not a dominant provision of the act, but only ancillary to its main pur-
pose. 288  At any rate, it was intended to remedy a scandalous practice by
the insurer to profit by defeating the right of the injured victim, although
it seemed so often an innocent practice to the courts which wooed privity
so ardently. The provision is to be found prevailing in those states which
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copied the Massachusetts statute.28 9  Under workmen's compensation, aft
execution-proof Ohio employer surrendered his policy to his insurer for
$i6oo in order to defeat the injured employee's $5000 judgment.290 The
attempt failed because the statute makes such settlements void. Since these
provisions have been in force, an accident policy is no longer a snare for
insured nor a barren hope to the injured.
A cursory review of the legislation, enacted in the last fifteen years,
which was designed primarily to curb the parasitic practices in accident in-
surance is a sad commentary upon our courts. By judicial decision, the
assured and the insurer preyed upon their victim, for whose injuries the
one was responsible and by whose injuries both were often enriched. Re-
cently, one opponent of compulsory automobile insurance denounced it be-
cause "There is no privity of contract between the parties to a motor vehicle
compensation case". 29 It took a quarter of a century of legislation to
correct partially the evil of irrelevant privity, but its ghost still stalks abroad.
Another opponent cries fanatically 292 "The rising tide of socialism is upon
(us)". Inspired by the fear of state insurance, they protest vigorously.
-2 9 3
For thirty years, "progressive underwriters" have soothed the public ear by
the slogan "An injury prevented is a benefaction, an injury compensated
is an apology". 94 To be freed from the embarrassment of compensating
injuries, for thirty years, the efforts of accident insurance companies have
been directed against obviating the necessity of compensating accidents.
We know the truth of what the insurance expert tells us when he says,
"Better one accident prevented than ten compensated". That truth has a
strong financial appeal to insurers as is evidenced by the many decisions,
which tardy legislation is now demonstrating. The socialism now dominant
in accident legislation is primarily an effective protest against the conse-
quences of the crass individualism 295 to which our courts gave currency.
Conclusion
Today, there is no doubt that the primary purpose of various types of
statutes regulating accident insurance is to afford relief to the injured vic-
tim 290 because there is a widespread belief that he is the person who should
benefit by accident insurance.2 97  Much of that legislation has -been due,
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however, not to any inability of the common law to achieve justice, but to
the artful misconception of the courts that privity was a relevant consid-
eration. Doubtless, the New Hampshire doctrine was based upon the spuri-
ous device of estoppel, but it had the merit of securing a just result.2 98 At
least, it was untainted by the irrelevarlt doctrine of privity which left the
injured party penniless and made collusion current. It violated neither one's
sense of justice nor one's sense of honesty. Tested by its result, it has been
vindicated by recent legislation; it needs no further justification. In the
judicial struggle between the competing philosophies which underlie the two
doctrines, form was of more than theoretical importance. In its result, the
New Hampshire doctrine recognized the social bearing of private rights.
Under the specious dominion of privity, it did not ignore the current ideas
of fair play. When a liability can be converted into a loss by giving a note
to liquidate a judgment that the assets of a policy may be made available
to an injured party, to insist that the distinction between loss and liability is
essentially sound is to allow a technical obstacle, primitive and archaic, to
encumber living institutions with dead ideas. The curse of such incumbrance
becomes patent by the increasing frequency with which the insurer sought
to defeat the right of the injured party to have the assets of the policy appro-
priated in compensation for his injury, when to have it diverted, meant
merely a traffic in his injuries, more brutal than slavery. To allow the assets
of an accident policy to be appropriated by creditors generally, when the
injured party has not been paid for his injuries, on the ground that both
he and they were strangers to the contract, exalts form and violates common
sense and common decency. To call the right of the injured party to an
accident policy, where his life and limb are the subject of the transaction,
merely a "derivative" right and therefore "secondary" is a legal pedantry
that judicial decision does not dignify.29 9 Such judicial interpretation out-
laws accident insurance when it relates to the physical integrity of third
persons. When courts are guilty of adopting it, one may sense the wis-
dom of Juvenal's observation that intellectual error is the more culpable
because of the rank of the persons who commit it. The course of judicial
decision in the majority of the states would seem to impose upon the de-
partments of insurance in many states, which still suffer from the evils of
such judicial interpretation, the duty of recommending to the legislature
adequate remedies, that the victims of accidents may no longer be victimized
by accident indemnity insurance.
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